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ABSTRACT This study examines financial reporting quality (FRQ) effects around voluntary 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoptions by German private firms across two 
important dimensions, earnings quality and disclosure practices. To capture differences in the 
motivations for IFRS adoptions, we identify four different types of IFRS adopting firms based on 
a comprehensive set of firm characteristics. We observe earnings quality improvements around 
IFRS adoptions primarily for one type of firms, which are young, fast growing and seeking access 
to public equity markets. Using a matched sample of private German GAAP and IFRS reporting 
firms, we find some evidence suggesting that IFRS also contribute to higher earnings quality. 
Recognizing that our earnings quality metrics are only incomplete measures of FRQ, we also 
compare the disclosure practices of IFRS and German GAAP firms. We find that all IFRS firm 
types disclose significantly more information in their financial reports and show a higher 
propensity to publish their financial reports voluntarily on the corporate website. Our findings 
indicate that failure to identify earnings quality changes around IFRS adoption cannot be 
automatically interpreted as IFRS adoption having no effect on the FRQ of (private) firms. 
Collectively, our results suggest that both incentives and accounting standards shape private firms’ 
FRQ.  
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1.  Introduction 
In this paper we investigate financial reporting quality (FRQ) effects around the voluntary 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) by German private firms across 
two important dimensions, earnings quality and disclosure practices.1 Our paper is motivated 
by two streams of the accounting literature. First, following the worldwide introduction of IFRS 
substantial research has focused on the financial reporting effects of IFRS adoptions in publicly 
listed firms. The collective empirical evidence suggests that while high quality accounting 
standards contribute to earnings quality improvements around voluntary IFRS adoptions (e.g., 
Barth et al. 2008), such improvements are confined to a subset of firms with strong reporting 
incentives (e.g., Daske et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015). Second, a growing literature 
examining FRQ in the private firm setting shows that variation in financing, ownership and 
organizational structure leads to heterogeneity in the earnings quality of private firms (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2008; Hope et al. 2013; Haw et al. 2014; Hope et al. 2017). However, neither of 
the two streams speaks to the impact of voluntary IFRS adoptions on the FRQ of private firms 
and how FRQ varies with firms’ motivations to switch accounting standards.  
This research question is particularly interesting since private firms are typically 
characterized by concentrated ownership, insider orientation and low demand for high FRQ 
(Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006). Yet, in recent years, an increasing number 
of private firms have voluntarily adopted IFRS. Empirical studies show that the decision to 
adopt is associated with external financing needs (as indicated by Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs), public bond issuances, high sales growth), certain governance features such as private 
                                                 
1  Throughout the paper we use the term financial reporting quality (FRQ) as an umbrella term subsuming the 
terms earnings (or accounting) quality and disclosure quality, both of which capture related, but different FRQ 
aspects. ‘‘Quality’’ refers to the extent to which accounting information reflects the underlying economic 
situation of the firm and is related to the broader concept of ‘‘transparency’’ (Ball et al. 2003). 
 2 
 
equity (PE) ownership and incorporated status, and internationalization (Francis et al. 2008; 
Bassemir 2017). However, it is not clear which of the numerous motives to adopt IFRS 
represent a commitment to higher FRQ and whether IFRS per se contribute to changes in FRQ 
of private firms in the first place.  
Based on prior evidence, we expect FRQ effects to be jointly determined by the quality of 
IFRS and private firms’ reporting incentives. Germany offers an ideal setting to investigate our 
research question. German GAAP or the German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch; 
hereafter, HGB) is insider-oriented and dominated by the prudence principle with limited 
recognition of assets and the discretionary use of provisions resulting in pervasive earnings 
management (Leuz and Wüstemann 2004; Hung and Subramanyam 2007).2 In contrast, IFRS 
are perceived as higher quality accounting standards because IFRS limit managerial discretion, 
promote more conditionally conservative accounting and require more disclosure (Leuz 2003; 
André et al. 2015). Hence, to the extent that accounting standards matter, financial statement 
effects are likely to be strong in this setting. However, given the lack of enforcement in the 
private firm setting and the flexibility embedded in IFRS (e.g., Kvaal and Nobes 2010), firm-
level reporting incentives are potentially important in shaping FRQ effects around IFRS 
adoptions (Daske et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015). 
Incentives for high FRQ arise primarily for two reasons (Beyer et al. 2010). First, when 
(potential) external capital providers want to evaluate the profit potential of the firm they need 
high FRQ to resolve information asymmetries with managers (valuation role). Second, when 
capital providers (e.g., owners, suppliers) cannot directly observe the actions of managers, they 
                                                 
2  We use the term “German GAAP” broadly to refer to all legal rules, principles and standards that German 
companies have to apply in the preparation of their financial statements. “HGB” refers to specific legal rules 




rely on financial reporting as a monitoring tool to alleviate agency problems (stewardship role). 
Yet, insiders to the firm often prefer opacity to protect their private benefits of control or 
informational rents (of relationship lenders) (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Therefore, we posit 
that in the private firm setting incentives for higher FRQ around IFRS adoptions will depend 
on the relative importance of valuation and stewardship problems and the insider-outsider 
conflict. To capture variation in the incentives for high FRQ, we identify different types of 
IFRS adopters.  
For our empirical analysis, we identify 273 German private firms that voluntarily adopted 
full IFRS in their consolidated financial statements between 1998 and 2010. We start our 
analysis by identifying the motivations of IFRS firms to switch accounting standards. 
Specifically, we classify private firms into different types of IFRS adopters using factor and 
cluster analysis based on a comprehensive set of firm characteristics and economic events that 
prior studies found to coincide with the accounting switch (e.g., Bassemir 2017). Since many 
of these observable firm characteristics and economic events are highly interdependent, we 
intentionally refrain from partitioning firms based on single characteristics and from drawing 
conclusions based on dichotomous classifications. Instead, we use factor analysis to identify 
latent factors based on the common variance among firm characteristics, which we interpret as 
the primary motivations for IFRS adoptions. Then, we perform cluster analysis on the factor 
scores to group firms into four types of firms that differ in terms of their primary motivations 
for IFRS adoption which are access to public equity markets (which we label EQUITY firms), 
access to public debt markets (DEBT firms), ownership and reorganization by private equity 
firms (FINCON-PE firms), and internationalization (REPUTATION firms). We argue that the 
valuation and stewardship problems are highest in EQUITY firms, because of the entrance of 
outside investors and the largest separation of ownership and control, and lowest in 
REPUTATION firms that do not tap public capital markets. While DEBT (FINCON-PE) firms 
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face higher (intermediate) valuation problems, stewardship problems are relatively low 
because of the tight grip of family (private equity) controlling owners. Taken together, we 
expect incentives for high FRQ to be highest in EQUITY and lowest in REPUTATION firms. 
We focus on two dimensions of private firm FRQ, earnings quality and disclosure. We 
measure earnings quality using two manifestations of earnings management, income 
smoothing and managing towards positive earnings, and one timely loss recognition metric 
(e.g., Barth et al. 2008; Ahmed et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015). We measure disclosure 
using the length of financial reports and the length of notes sections therein, the level of 
disclosure detail related to goodwill and deferred taxes, two balance sheet items that are 
particularly different between IFRS and German GAAP, and firms’ propensity to voluntarily 
publish financial reports on their websites. Since IFRS are outsider oriented, we take the 
perspective of outsiders and consider less earnings management, more timely loss recognition 
and more disclosure as high FRQ.   
For our earnings quality analysis, we perform two sets of empirical tests. The first set of 
tests examines heterogeneity in earnings quality across different types of IFRS adopting firms. 
First, we make a cross-sectional comparison of the earnings quality of different types of IFRS 
adopters in the post-adoption period with the average earnings quality of a pooled (unmatched) 
benchmark sample of private German GAAP firms over the sample period. We find that 
EQUITY firms exhibit significantly less income smoothing and more timely loss recognition 
in the post-adoption period than the average German GAAP firm and other types of IFRS 
adopters. In contrast, DEBT firms generally smooth income more than German GAAP firms 
suggesting that despite their capital market orientation insiders create incentives for managers 
to conceal firm performance. FINCON-PE and REPUTATION firms exhibit a similar level of 
income smoothing and timely loss recognition as the average German GAAP firm. 
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Interestingly, all IFRS firm types generally show a lower incidence of small profits than 
German GAAP firms.  
Second, for a subsample of firms where pre- and post-adoption data are available, we 
examine whether the different IFRS-adoption types experience a within-firm improvement of 
earnings quality. Again, we find that EQUITY firms experience the largest improvement in 
earnings quality around IFRS adoption consistent with these firms facing the greatest valuation 
and stewardship problems. Furthermore, neither DEBT nor FINCON-PE firms evidence 
improvements in earnings quality around IFRS adoption. Interestingly, REPUTATION firms 
experience an improvement in their earnings quality in the post-adoption period.  
To isolate the incremental effect of IFRS, our second set of tests repeats the two previous 
analyses using a propensity score-matched sample of private IFRS and German GAAP firms. 
While the matched sample tests are the most rigorous in terms of empirical validity, they come 
at the cost of a significantly reduced sample size, which prevents us from running these tests 
separately for each type of firms. We find evidence that IFRS firms exhibit higher earnings 
quality (improvements) after (around) the adoption of IFRS than their German GAAP 
counterparts indicating an incremental effect of accounting standards. Finally, a differences-
in-differences analysis provides weak statistical support for IFRS firms improving their 
earnings quality more than German GAAP firms.  
Our earnings quality analyses have several caveats. First, given that we rely on balance 
sheet accruals, important economic events like IPOs can mechanically lead to large changes in 
the earnings quality proxies (Hribar and Collins 2002). We mitigate this concern by excluding 
the first IFRS year, but cannot entirely eliminate it. Second and related, the empirical proxies 
employed in our analyses contain substantial measurement error that increases the possibility 
of Type 1 and Type 2 errors. Finally, earnings quality proxies are only incomplete measures of 
overall FRQ.  
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In order to capture other aspects of FRQ where IFRS adoption effects are presumably 
easier to detect, we also examine the disclosure practices of private firms. We find that financial 
reports prepared by IFRS firms and in particular their notes sections contain significantly more 
pages than those of matched German GAAP firms. Since page numbers is a quantitative 
measure potentially influenced by boilerplate-type disclosure, we further construct a disclosure 
content score designed to capture the level of disclosure detail regarding deferred taxes and 
goodwill. Our results show that IFRS financial reports offer significantly more detailed 
information on deferred taxes and goodwill. These findings combine to suggest that IFRS firms 
increase both the quantity and the level of detail of disclosure. To test whether private firms go 
beyond the disclosure requirements imposed by German law and IFRS, we finally measure the 
propensity of private firms to publish their financial reports voluntarily on the corporate 
website. We find that private firms adopting IFRS are significantly more likely to make their 
financial reports publicly available on corporate websites than their German GAAP 
counterparts. All of these results hold after controlling for a comprehensive set of firm 
characteristics and across all four firm types suggesting that IFRS adoption leads to increased 
disclosure. An important implication of these findings is that failure to identify earnings quality 
changes around IFRS adoption cannot be automatically interpreted as IFRS adoption having 
no effect on the FRQ of (private) firms. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our knowledge we are the 
first to document both earnings quality and disclosure effects of voluntary IFRS adoption in 
the private firm setting. Thereby, we extend the literature investigating the consequences of 
voluntary IFRS adoption for FRQ in publicly listed firms (e.g., Barth et al. 2008). Second, we 
contribute to the research focusing on firm-level incentives as the source of heterogeneity in 
IFRS adoption effects (e.g., Daske et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015). Prior studies use 
relatively crude and abstract proxies for reporting incentives that are often limited in scope, or 
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only used on an aggregated level and not necessarily related to actual reporting behaviour 
changes (see discussion in section 3.1). A novel aspect of our empirical approach is that we 
take into account interdependencies between numerous firm characteristics to identify different 
types of IFRS adopters and to put IFRS adoption into private firms’ broader decision contexts. 
Our analysis by firm types highlights that simple dichotomous classifications of firms based 
on individual variables (e.g., size, leverage, sales growth) are only incomplete measures of 
reporting incentives. Third, we contribute to the small literature that compares earnings quality 
in private firms to public firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006) or 
examines heterogeneity within the group of privately held firms (e.g., Beuselinck et al. 2009; 
Haw et al. 2014; Hope et al. 2017). We present new evidence that FRQ of private firms varies 
considerably across firms depending on their reporting incentives and accounting standards. 
Finally, our findings suggest that failure to find IFRS adoption effects on one aspect of FRQ, 
e.g., earnings quality, cannot be interpreted as (private) firms adopting IFRS merely as a label. 
Rather, variation in reporting incentives appears to result in changes of different aspects of 
financial reporting around IFRS adoptions. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional setting. In section 
3, we review the related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 4 describes the sample 
selection procedure. Section 5 delineates the classification of IFRS adopting firm types. The 
results of the empirical analysis are presented in sections 6 (earnings quality) and 7 (disclosure 
practices). Section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2.  Institutional setting 
Germany is typically characterized as a code-law system with low investor protection and 
strong insider orientation. German GAAP are geared towards the contracting needs of creditors 
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who have private information channels (Leuz and Wüstemann 2004). In contrast, IFRS cater 
more to the information needs of outsiders by promoting financial statements that are prepared 
for providing information that is useful in making economic decisions (IASB 2010). The 
different objectives of German GAAP and IFRS are reflected in the recognition and 
measurement rules of the two accounting systems. The dominant role of the prudence principle 
under German GAAP tends to (deliberately) understate assets and revenues, and overstate 
liabilities and expenses, which results in unconditionally conservative financial reports (e.g., 
Ball and Shivakumar 2005).3 For example, revenues generally can only be recognized in 
income if it is highly probable that they will be realized. The depreciation of property, plant 
and equipment is typically tax driven rather than based on the economic useful life of the asset. 
Unlike under IFRS, self-generated intangible assets cannot be recognized and purchased 
goodwill is amortized on a straight-line basis. The recognition of deferred tax assets is allowed, 
while the recognition of deferred tax liabilities is required. Furthermore, several accounting 
options allow for substantial reporting discretion (Joos and Lang 1994; Harris et al. 1994; Leuz 
and Wüstemann 2004). For example, German GAAP allows the recognition of expense 
provisions, which provide a convenient tool for income smoothing.  
In contrast, consistent with their outsider orientation, IFRS aim to limit management’s 
discretion in determining accounting amounts (Barth et al. 2008). Under IFRS, for example, 
expense provisions such as those under German GAAP must not be created. Impairment rules 
for financial instruments allow only the recognition of incurred losses, but not the provision 
for general unspecified risks (IAS 39). Other aspects in IFRS implement a certain degree of 
                                                 
3  Our discussion here is based on the German GAAP rules applicable until the end of 2009. A recent reform of 
German GAAP (through the Bilanzrechtsmodernisierungsgesetz), effective from January 1, 2010, aimed to 
reduce differences between IFRS and the revised German GAAP in many areas. This regulatory change affects 
only the final year of our sample period and is unlikely to affect our results.   
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conservatism, such as the recognition of probable liabilities versus the non-recognition of 
contingent assets (IAS 37) or the impairment of long-lived assets (IAS 36) (André et al. 2015). 
Finally, IFRS require significantly more disclosure in financial reports than German GAAP 
(Daske and Gebhardt 2006). Given these substantial differences between German GAAP and 
IFRS, financial statement effects of IFRS adoptions are likely to be large in this setting. 
However, IFRS also provide a number of accounting options, which potentially mitigate 
financial reporting changes around IFRS adoption (e.g., Kvaal and Nobes 2010).4    
Once a German private firm chooses to report under IFRS, it must apply the full set of 
standards, even if the decision to adopt IFRS is a voluntary decision. In addition, similar to 
publicly listed firms, certified auditors must verify the financial statements of (large) German 
private firms (Sect. 316 para. 2 HGB (German Commercial Code)). However, privately held 
firms are not subject to the formal enforcement mechanism established in 2005, unless they 
have securities issued on a regulated exchange in Germany (Sect. 342b para. 2 HGB). Given 
the lack of enforcement in the private firm setting, firm-specific characteristics likely have 
large effects on preparers' reporting incentives (Pope and McLeay 2011). However, the lack of 
enforcement might provide preparers and auditors with incentives to exploit the flexibility 
provided under IFRS to choose accounting options that minimise the number of changes to 
their accounting systems, thereby reducing the costs of transition to IFRS (Kvaal and Nobes 
2010; Nobes 2013).  
All German incorporated entities need to disclose their financial statements to the public 
by electronically filing them with the German corporate register (Elektronischer 
Bundesanzeiger) no later than 12 months after fiscal year-end (Sect. 325 para. 1 HGB). Thus, 
                                                 
4  For example, IAS 2 allows the first in first out (FIFO) or the weighted average method for inventory valuation; 
for investment property, IAS 40 allows the cost or the fair value method. 
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archival data on the financial statements of German private firms are comprehensively 
available which allows us to study earnings quality and disclosure practices in the private firm 
setting.  
 
3.  Related literature and hypotheses development 
3.1. Voluntary IFRS adoptions and FRQ  
Although there is a substantial literature examining the FRQ effects and economic 
consequences of voluntary IFRS adoptions, most of the extant studies focus on publicly listed 
firms and provide mixed evidence (see Brüggemann et al. 2013 for an overview). Exploiting 
the German setting, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2005) compare the earnings management 
behaviour of voluntary IFRS adopters with that of firms reporting under German GAAP. They 
do not find differences in earnings management between German GAAP versus IFRS listed 
firms. In contrast, using a more comprehensive sample of German listed firms that adopted 
IFRS, Gassen and Sellhorn (2006) find that IFRS firms have more persistent, less predictable 
and more conditionally conservative earnings than a propensity score matched sample of 
German GAAP firms. Hung and Subramanyam (2007) also examine German voluntary IFRS 
adopters and exploit the fact that in the adoption year firms have to restate their comparative 
figures and compare accounting numbers prepared under German GAAP and IFRS. They find 
some evidence that IFRS income is more conditionally conservative, but not more value 
relevant than German GAAP income. In a cross-country study examining public IFRS adopters 
from 21 countries, Barth et al. (2008) document that IFRS adopters evidence less earnings 
management, more timely loss recognition and more value relevance of accounting amounts 
than a matched sample of firms reporting under domestic GAAPs.  
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The above studies focus primarily on specific properties of earnings and/or their 
association with stock returns to evaluate the FRQ effects of IFRS adoption. By design, these 
metrics do not capture differences and changes in the information provided in actual annual 
reports. The study of Daske and Gebhardt (2006) stands out in that it examines the effect of 
IFRS and US GAAP on firms’ disclosure quality. They use disclosure quality scores extracted 
from detailed analyses of annual reports by accounting experts for a comprehensive sample of 
Austrian, German and Swiss publicly listed firms. Daske and Gebhardt (2006) document that 
disclosure quality, as perceived by experts in their ratings of annual reports, increased 
significantly under IFRS in the three countries analysed.  
We add to the above literature by investigating the voluntary IFRS adoption effects on 
earnings quality metrics and disclosure practices of private firms. 
More recent studies document significant heterogeneity in IFRS adoption effects, but focus 
primarily on country-level variation and mandatory IFRS adoptions (e.g., Daske et al. 2008; 
Jeanjean and Stolowy 2008; Ahmed et al. 2013; André et al. 2015). However, the evidence on 
the role of firm-level incentives in the context of voluntary IFRS adoptions, the focus of our 
study, is scarce. Using the German setting, Christensen et al. (2015) examine IFRS adoption 
effects on the earnings quality of voluntary IFRS adopters versus mandatory IFRS adopters 
that were forced to comply with IFRS as of 2005. They find that earnings quality improvements 
in terms of less income smoothing, more timely loss recognition and increased value relevance 
are confined to firms with incentives to adopt IFRS, that is, voluntary IFRS adopters. 
Christensen et al. (2015) conclude that reporting incentives dominate accounting standards in 
shaping earnings quality. Daske et al. (2013) show that even voluntary IFRS adopters exhibit 
significant heterogeneity in their reporting incentives. They differentiate between "serious" 
versus "label" IFRS adopters using firm-level changes in reporting incentives, actual reporting 
behaviour and external reporting environment around IFRS adoption. Daske et al. (2013) 
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document that capital market benefits of IFRS adoption, in the form of increased liquidity and 
reduced cost of capital, are confined to serious IFRS adopters. Their reporting incentives score, 
however, is only weakly correlated with the actual reporting behaviour variable.5 In other 
words, it remains unclear which firm attributes of the IFRS adopters are associated with 
changes in earnings quality in the first place. We complement these studies by using more 
intuitive measures of firms’ reporting incentives to further our understanding of what drives 
reporting behaviour changes around IFRS adoptions in the private firm setting. 
3.2. Reporting incentives of private firms and FRQ 
In the public firm setting, the demand for financial reporting transparency arises primarily 
for two reasons (see Beyer et al. 2010). First, financial reporting information reduces ex ante 
information asymmetries between managers and (potential) capital providers and helps them 
to evaluate the profit potential of the firm (valuation role). Second, financial reporting 
information allows capital providers to monitor the use of their capital and thereby to mitigate 
ex post agency problems (stewardship role). Thus, firms’ reporting incentives are determined 
by the relative importance of the valuation and stewardship role within the firm (Beyer et al. 
2010).  
However, information asymmetries and agency problems play typically only a minor role 
in private firms (Fama and Jensen 1985). Private firms are characterised by concentrated 
ownership with tight control over management where key stakeholders usually have access to 
information through private channels, which reduces the demand for transparent financial 
reporting (e.g., Hope et al. 2013). The main financiers of German private firms are banks with 
close relationships to the firms (“Hausbank”), often with a seat on their supervisory boards 
                                                 




(Leuz and Wüstemann 2004). In fact, insiders (i.e., controlling owners and creditors) might 
benefit from opaque reporting because it protects their private benefits of control and 
information rents, respectively (Rajan and Zingales 1998). Consistent with this argument 
several papers show that earnings quality is lower for private than for public firms (Ball and 
Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Hope et al. 2013) and income smoothing of German 
private firms increases with the importance of bank lending relationships (Gassen and Fülbier 
2015; Bigus and Hillebrand 2017). Therefore, in addition to the relative importance of the 
valuation and stewardship problem the conflict between insiders and (potential) outsiders likely 
plays a role in shaping private firms’ FRQ. 
The literature examining heterogeneity of FRQ within private firms is scarce (Hope and 
Vyas 2017). Yet, private firms also exhibit substantial heterogeneity in their capital providers, 
including families, private equity investors, banks, bond holders, who face different agency 
and information problems that shape their financial reporting needs. Moreover, the financing 
and governance arrangements of private firms can change over time leading to a corresponding 
evolution of the role of financial reporting (Armstrong et al. 2010). For example, when private 
firms aim to raise external funds, e.g., through bond or equity IPOs, the valuation problem and 
reporting incentives to choose value maximizing reporting choices gain in importance. In 
support of this notion, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) find for a sample of UK private firms 
undergoing an equity IPO that they report more conservatively to reduce information 
asymmetries with outside investors. Haw et al. (2014) find similar results for Korean private 
firms that undergo public bond IPOs.  
In addition, variation in the organizational and ownership structure of private firms can 
affect the magnitude of stewardship problems between owners and managers. For example, 
Bigus et al. (2016) find that incorporated German private firms exhibit higher levels of income 
smoothing and conservatism than partnerships and one-person businesses. Hope et al. (2017) 
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find for US private firms that accrual quality is positively related to being organized as C 
corporation which are more likely to be managed by non-owners and are allowed to have an 
unlimited number of shareholders. Consistent with institutional owners’ incentives to structure 
financial reporting in a way that maximizes the price at which they eventually sell the firm to 
outsiders, Beuselinck et al. (2009) show that Belgian private firms with PE ownership report 
more conservatively and engage less in earnings management than non-PE sponsored firms. 
Katz (2009) finds similar results for a sample of US private firms.  
The disclosure practices of private firms have received even less attention in prior 
literature. Beuselinck et al. (2008) document for Belgian private firms a significant increase in 
voluntary financial disclosure following private equity participation. Examining private UK 
companies, Dedman and Lennox (2009) show empirically that managers are more concerned 
about revealing proprietary information when the potential for such disclosures to create 
competitive harm is high. Specifically, private companies are more likely to withhold sales and 
costs of sales information from their publicly-filed accounts when they face a higher degree of 
competition or are more profitable (Dedman and Lennox 2009). Further, particularly pertinent 
for our setting, Bernard et al. (2017) find that German private firms traditionally were reluctant 
to file their financial statements with the corporate register even when legally required to do 
so.  
None of the above-mentioned studies is concerned with the effects of IFRS on private 
firms’ FRQ. We complement this literature by examining the effect of IFRS adoption and 
firms’ motivation to adopt on private firms’ earnings quality and disclosure practices.  
3.3. IFRS firm types and FRQ 
Closely related to our paper are a few studies examining private firms’ decisions to adopt 
IFRS (e.g., Francis et al. 2008; Bassemir 2017). Using survey data from the World Bank, 
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Francis et al. (2008) find for an international sample of private firms that private limited 
liability companies (rather than sole proprietorships and partnerships), growth firms, larger 
firms, firms with greater external financing, firms with foreign owners and firms engaged in 
export activities, are more likely to adopt IFRS. Bassemir (2017) represents the most 
comprehensive analysis of voluntary IFRS adoptions in the private firm setting that uses actual 
financial statement data of German private firms. He finds that private firms with strong 
external financing needs (as indicated by high sales growth, IPOs and bond issuances), 
incorporated legal status, private equity ownership, larger share of international activities are 
more likely to adopt IFRS voluntarily. The paper also reviews the annual reports for self-
declared motivations of sample firms to switch to IFRS and finds that enhanced comparability, 
higher transparency and quality of financial information as well as IPO readiness are major 
reasons cited for IFRS adoption.  
The evidence in Francis et al. (2008) and Bassemir (2017) provides important insights and 
the starting point for our study, but it cannot directly speak to specific factors that drive earnings 
quality improvements around IFRS adoptions in private firms. Moreover, most of the prior 
studies reviewed in section 3.2 selectively focus on single corporate characteristics that theory 
predicts to lead to stronger reporting incentives. However, private firms experience significant 
changes in their characteristics along several dimensions simultaneously around IFRS 
adoptions (see section 5.1), which jointly determine the relative importance of the valuation 
and stewardship problems versus other considerations (e.g., insider-outsider conflict, 
comparability) in the IFRS adoption decision. 
To capture the relative importance of the various motives for IFRS adoption, in this paper 
we take into account interdependencies among numerous characteristics of IFRS adopting 
firms, i.e., the costs and benefits of IFRS adoptions that have been identified by prior literature 
(e.g., Bassemir 2017). In particular, using factor and cluster analyses we identify specific firm 
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types that are likely to vary with respect to valuation, stewardship and other (e.g., reputational) 
problems (see section 5.1 for the empirical implementation). We expect higher (improvements) 
in earnings quality particularly for firm types for which the valuation and/or the stewardship 
problems become more relevant. 
As indicated earlier, a potential issue with earnings quality analyses is that they are prone 
to substantial measurement error. Specifically, managers can make a number of subtle and 
difficult-to-detect measurement choices that affect earnings quality metrics. In contrast, the 
room for discretionary disclosure choices is typically more limited (but not eliminated) under 
IFRS for two primary reasons. First, applicable IFRS contain specific guidance as to which 
financial information must be disclosed. Second, the (non-)compliance with disclosure 
requirements is easier to verify by the auditor, e.g., by using very detailed disclosure checklists. 
Combined with the more extensive disclosure requirements under IFRS, we generally expect a 
detectable increase in disclosure quantity and detail in the annual reports of IFRS adopting 
firms. Furthermore, if voluntary IFRS adopters are more committed to financial reporting 
transparency, we predict a higher propensity of IFRS firms to disclose their annual reports on 
the websites than German GAAP firms. Both of these effects will be more pronounced for the 
types of firms with greater valuation and/or stewardship problems. 
  
4.  Sample selection and collection of data 
We start our sample selection with the August 2011 version of Hoppenstedt-Bilanzen that 
contains detailed financial statement information for all German firms filing their financial 
reports with the corporate register (Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger). We search for industrial 
firms (1) whose equity shares are not listed on a stock exchange and (2) which prepare 
consolidated financial statements. Our focus is on consolidated financial statements, because 
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they have no legal implications for dividend distributions or taxes and exclusively serve 
informational purposes (Leuz and Wüstemann 2004). We do not include firms that are 
subsidiaries of other IFRS firms. Those firms are de-facto mandatory IFRS adopters, because 
they essentially have no choice in accounting standards and must comply with IFRS due to 
group accounting policies. 
Our sample period starts in 1998, from which year the German Commercial Code allowed 
German private firms to replace German GAAP with IFRS for consolidated financial 
statements only, and ends in 2010.6 As Table 1 shows, applying these search criteria yields 
3,328 unique firms including an initial sample of 345 IFRS firms. Based on these numbers, the 
overall proportion of German private parent firms adopting IFRS in their consolidated financial 
statements appears relatively small, with only ten percent of the investigated firms. However, 
when contrasted with prior research on public companies (see section 3.1), the (absolute) 
number of voluntary IFRS adopters is substantial.7 
For each of these 345 firms, we manually collect information on whether it adopted IFRS 
as a private firm, the presence of a private equity investor, bond or profit participation 
certificate issuances, whether it has ever planned, underwent or cancelled an IPO during our 
sample period. As a result of this procedure, we delete 251 firms that adopted IFRS as listed 
entities and subsequently went private. Further, we add 87 firms that completed an IPO 
between 2001 and 2010 which offers us the possibility to study firms that were privately held 
                                                 
6  During this period IFRS changed particularly as a result of the 2001-2003 improvement project of the then 
newly formed IASB, in which thirteen International Accounting Standards (IAS) were revised and one IAS 
was withdrawn. The objective of these changes was to improve the quality of international accounting 
standards primarily by removing implicit or explicit accounting treatments and extending the amount of 
disclosures (https://www.iasplus.com/en/projects/completed/aip/project86). The revised standards have been 
effective since 1 January 2005. About 17 percent of our IFRS sample firms adopted IFRS before 2005. Since 
earlier IFRS allowed more discretion and required less disclosure, any noise stemming from the inclusion of 
these early adopters will bias against our predictions. 
7  For example, the single-country study by Hung and Subramanyam (2007) uses 80 public IFRS firms. Covering 
21 countries, the study of Barth et al. (2008) contains 327 public IFRS treatment firms. 
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but decided to go public (IPO). German private firms that sell equity to the public regulated 
markets are required to adopt IFRS (starting from 2005) (Sect. 315a HGB). Nevertheless, we 
view IPO firms as voluntary IFRS adopters, since they could have chosen a market segment 
that does not require the application of IFRS (see also Gassen and Sellhorn 2006). Overall, 
these steps leave us with an initial sample of 3,164 firms (273 IFRS and 2,891 German GAAP 
firms).  
{Insert Table 1 about here} 
Data requirements further reduce the sample to a maximum of 228 IFRS firms and 1,986 
German GAAP firms in the earnings quality analyses. For the disclosure analyses, we hand-
collect data from the financial reports of a propensity score-matched sample of German private 
firms. The financial reports are retrieved from firms’ websites, if available, otherwise from the 
corporate register (Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger). Due to the costs associated with hand-
collection, the sample underlying the disclosure analyses is smaller. In total, we were able to 
collect disclosure information for a matched sample of 140 IFRS and German GAAP firms, 
respectively, for the period from 1998 to 2010. Depending on data availability, the number of 
observations can vary across our empirical tests. This is particularly due to a large number of 
IFRS adopters in our sample that do not have pre-adoption data available. Table 1 shows the 
different samples used in the subsequent empirical analyses. 
 
5.  Identification of firm types and their reporting incentives 
5.1. Identification of firm types 
This section describes how we use factor analysis and cluster analysis to classify IFRS 
adopters into different types. The initial inputs to the factor analysis are motivated by firm 
characteristics that prior literature found to be associated with a higher likelihood of IFRS 
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adoption in the German private firm setting and private firms’ self-proclaimed reasons for IFRS 
adoption (see Bassemir 2017, in particular Appendix A and B): firm size, profitability (return 
on assets), proxies for external financing needs and arrangements (e.g., sales growth, leverage, 
IPOs, bond and profit certificate issuances), corporate governance (e.g., legal form, PE 
ownership) and internationalization (percentage of foreign sales).  
Figure 1 shows yearly changes in key firm characteristics during a 10-year period around 
IFRS adoption dates for a subset of firms, for which data is available both for the pre- and post-
adoption period. Average growth rates in total assets, foreign sales, and operating cash flow 
(OCF) are increasing during the 10-year period, while leverage drops in the post-adoption 
period. The rise in total assets is particularly strong in the adoption year, which is likely due to 
mechanical accounting effects. This suggests that, on average, adopting firms make material 
changes to their accounting system in the adoption year rather than transition gradually to 
IFRS.8 With regard to the indicator variables, Figure 1 shows that bonds, IPO and private equity 
(PE) ownership occur more frequently in the three years starting with the adoption date than in 
other years. These results highlight that IFRS firms undergo substantial economic changes that 
are largely bundled around the time of IFRS adoption.  
{Insert Figure 1 about here} 
Since most of these economic changes are highly correlated with each other and jointly 
determine firms’ reporting incentives and decision to adopt IFRS, it is difficult to draw 
conclusions based on a single characteristic (Bushee 1998). To mitigate this problem, we 
                                                 
8   Therefore, in our empirical analyses we exclude the IFRS adoption year. The notion that IFRS adopting firms 
make material changes to their accounting system is further substantiated by the analysis of reconciliation 
adjustments between German GAAP and IFRS for a sub-sample of 131 private firms where reconciliation 
numbers are available. Untabulated analyses show that a conversion from German GAAP to IFRS leads to a 
mean (median) change of 14.1 percent (9.3 percent) in total assets, of 14.8 percent (5.8 percent) in book value 
of equity, and of 4.6 percent (zero percent) in annual sales. The difference for total assets is significant using 
both t-test and Wilcoxon test, the difference for book value of equity is only significant using a Wilcoxon test, 
and the difference in sales is not statistically significant.  
 20 
 
perform a common factor analysis with an oblique rotation.9 Factor analysis extracts 
unobservable underlying factors (or constructs) from a large number of directly observable, 
interrelated variables. It explicitly examines the pattern of correlation among several observed 
variables to identify (distinct) groups of interrelated firm characteristics. This allows us to gain 
insight into different categories of IFRS adopting firms, making it easier and more intuitive to 
understand the complex construct of reporting incentives. Once common factors are identified, 
we calculate factor scores that are used in the subsequent cluster analysis. 
Table 2 Panel A presents the factors identified through common factor analysis that we 
interpret as the main driving forces behind IFRS adoption.10 The first factor captures the equity 
market orientation of a firm. Firms with high scores on this factor are young, relatively small, 
with high external financing needs as indicated by high sales growth and a high propensity for 
an IPO, and a greater separation of ownership and control as indicated by their legal 
organization as stock corporations. The second factor relates to debt market orientation of a 
firm. Private firms that score high on this factor are large, externally rated and they have access 
to public bond markets. The third factor captures the relatively weak financial condition and 
PE ownership of a firm. Specifically, firms with high scores for this factor are highly leveraged, 
less profitable and PE owned. Finally, the fourth factor relates to internationalization and is 
high for firms with a large proportion of foreign sales, a Big5 auditor and operations in a 
medium- or high-tech industry. 
{Insert Table 2} 
                                                 
9  The common factor analysis has been previously used by accounting researchers in somewhat different 
contexts (Bushee 1998; Leuz 2000). We choose the oblique rotation to allow for correlation between factors. 
10  For clarity, all factor loadings smaller than 0.3 in absolute terms are omitted. All factors but one has an 
eigenvalue of greater than 1. Nevertheless, we retain four instead of three factors, because of better 
interpretability. The factor patterns of "Equity market orientation" and "Debt market orientation" remain 
similar, independent of the choice of the number of retained factors. 
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In order to partition the sample into our final clusters or types of IFRS adopters, we perform 
k-means cluster analysis on the factor scores. Thereby, our goal is to identify firm types, which 
are similar in their reporting incentives within each type, but different across types. Panel B of 
Table 2 shows the result of the k-means cluster analysis and presents the means of the four 
factor scores and of all firm-specific variables for the four-cluster solution. Based on the mean 
factor scores, EQUITY firms’ primary motivation for IFRS adoption is access to public equity 
markets. They are young (low Age) and fast growing (high Sales Growth). For DEBT firms 
factor scores indicate access to public bond markets and a large proportion of international 
activities as primary motivations. These firms are large (Size) and mature (high Age). FINCON-
PE firms are characterized by a weak financial condition and private equity ownership (highest 
and positive Financial Condition score). These firms probably have been taken over by PE 
investors in a leveraged buyout and are reorganized to prepare them for sale in the mid-term as 
indicated by the relatively large share of (planned) IPOs (29 percent). Finally, REPUTATION 
firms are internationally active (positive International activity) and in a very good financial 
condition (negative Financial condition).  
Table 2 Panel C shows the distribution of post-adoption IFRS firm-years for the different 
types of IFRS adopting firms. It becomes apparent that while EQUITY firms started to adopt 
IFRS already in the early 2000s, most firms switched their accounting standards following the 
worldwide mandatory introduction of IFRS in 2005. Remarkably, there is a particularly 
significant jump in the frequency of IFRS adoptions by REPUTATION firms from 2005 
onwards. Given that only a tiny portion of these firms is capital market oriented (see Table 2 
Panel B), this adoption pattern is consistent with REPUTATION firms following the global 
trend of IFRS adoption and switching their accounting standards to achieve comparability with 





5.2. Reporting incentives of firm types 
An important question of our paper is how reporting incentives of firm types affect FRQ 
around voluntary IFRS adoptions. To assess the reporting incentives of the different firm types, 
we rely on the theoretical framework presented in section 3.2. and the descriptive 
characterizations of firm types in section 5.1. Specifically, we argue that the valuation and 
stewardship problems are highest in EQUITY firms, because of the entrance of outside 
investors and the largest separation of ownership and control. While DEBT firms face valuation 
problems with investors in the bond markets, stewardship problems are relatively low because 
of the tight control of family owners (as also indicated by the relatively low share of Stock 
Corporations in Table 2). In addition, controlling owners of these firms are often willing to 
accept higher cost of debt rather than to increase transparency to protect their private benefits 
of control.11  
FINCON-PE firms face intermediate valuation problems because their PE owners 
typically want to sell their firms in the mid-term or take it public. However, the weak financial 
condition might incentivize them to smooth income in order to avoid the breach of financial 
covenants. Furthermore, the low level of stock corporations as legal form (only 12 percent) 
indicates that most of these firms are at a relatively early stage of their conversion into publicly 
listed firms. Stewardship problems are probably low, since PE owners typically have tight 
control over management. Finally, valuation and stewardship problems do not seem pervasive 
in REPUTATION firms since they rarely plan to engage in arm’s length financing and are 
usually closely monitored by family owners. They might benefit from the application of IFRS 
                                                 
11  See, for example, the Handelsblatt (German business newspaper) article from 24 September 2012 titled “Wer 
die Börse meider, zahlt drauf“ [in English: Who avoids the stock market, pays more]. 
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by increasing the comparability between internationally active firms even without making 
significant changes to their financial accounting numbers (Hail et al. 2010).  
Based on the arguments above, we expect incentives for high FRQ (improvements) after 
(around) IFRS adoption to be strongest in EQUITY firms, medium in the “in-between” clusters 
DEBT and FINCON-PE and lowest in REPUTATION firms. 
 
6.  Empirical analyses of earnings quality 
6.1. Methodology and measurement of earnings quality 
We operationalize earnings quality using several earnings management and timely loss 
recognition metrics (e.g., Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2008; Christensen et al. 2015). 
Consistent with prior studies and the outsider orientation of IFRS, we assume that, ceteris 
paribus, lower levels of earnings management and more timely loss recognition indicate higher 
earnings quality. We conduct two sets of tests. In the first set of tests, we are interested in 
whether the earnings quality of different types of IFRS adopters varies in the predicted ways 
and how their earnings quality compares to the average German GAAP firm. We face the 
limitation that many of our IFRS adopters do not have data available in the pre-adoption period. 
Therefore, we conduct one cross-sectional test comparing the earnings quality of different 
types of IFRS adopters in the post-adoption period with each other and with the average 
earnings quality of a comprehensive (unmatched) sample of German GAAP firms during the 
sample period. Subsequently, we run a within-firm analysis for each IFRS firm type to gauge 
changes in earnings quality around the accounting switch, effectively using each firm as its 
own control.  
In our second set of analyses, we attempt to isolate the incremental effect of IFRS on firms' 
earnings quality. Towards this end, we apply the propensity score method to match our IFRS 
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firm types with German GAAP firms. For example, to match EQUITY firms, we first calculate 
propensity scores for each German GAAP firm based on the conditional probability of being 
an EQUITY firm. The score is computed in a probit model where we include the whole set of 
variables also used in the factor analysis as conditioning variables (see Table 2). We then match 
each EQUITY firm with a German GAAP firm with the closest propensity score, without 
replacement. We repeat this procedure for all firm types. A drawback of matching is that it 
significantly reduces the sample size, making it impossible to run the earnings quality analyses 
by firm types. Therefore, we compare the earnings quality of the pooled IFRS sample with that 
of the matched German GAAP counterparts. Again, one test is a cross-sectional comparison 
using post-adoption observations only, and another test is a within-firm analysis of earnings 
quality changes around IFRS adoption for a smaller sample with both pre- and post-adoption 
data available. Finally, the matched design also allows for a differences-in-differences analysis. 
We examine two types of earnings management, earnings smoothing and managing 
towards small positive earnings. In line with Barth et al. (2008), we measure earnings 
smoothing using the following three empirical constructs: variability of changes in earnings, 
the standard deviation of changes in earnings relative to the standard deviation of changes in 
cash flows, and the correlation between accruals and cash flows. The idea behind these 
measures is that earnings that do (not) recognize economic gains and losses on a timely basis 
should exhibit higher (lower) earnings variability, higher variability of earnings relative to the 
variability of cash flows and a less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows. We 
expect that firms engaging less in income smoothing behaviour exhibit higher earnings 
variability (e.g., Lang et al. 2006; Barth et al. 2008). Furthermore, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
suggest that timely gain and loss recognition results in higher variability of earnings relative to 
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cash flows. Finally, we assume that a more negative correlation between accruals and cash 
flows is reflective of income smoothing behaviour.12  
In order to construct our empirical metrics, we follow the methodology outlined in Barth 
et al. (2008) which we detail in the Appendix. 
6.2. Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the earnings quality analyses 
Table 3 Panel A contains descriptive statistics on the test variables and the firm-specific 
characteristics for the full IFRS and German GAAP samples over the entire sample period from 
1998 to 2010. The descriptive statistics on the test variables are largely comparable to those 
reported in Barth et al. (2008) and Christensen et al. (2015). Most notably, IFRS firms have 
significantly smaller accruals (as indicated by ACC), significantly fewer incidents of small 
profits (SPOS) and significantly more incidents of large losses (LNEG) than German GAAP 
firms. Table 3 further reveals that IFRS adopters are larger (Size), more likely to be registered 
as stock corporation (Stock Corporation), have more international sales (Foreign Sales), more 
likely to be characterized by private equity involvement (PE Ownership), more leveraged 
(Leverage), growing faster (Sales Growth), and more likely to raise external capital by issuing 
public bonds or equity (Bonds or IPO) than German GAAP firms. These results are consistent 
with prior research on the determinants of voluntary IFRS adoptions (e.g., Dumontier and 
Raffournier 1998; Bassemir 2017). 
{Insert Table 3} 
Table 3 Panel B reports the comparison of the same test variables and covariates for the 
matched sample of IFRS and German GAAP firms. It appears that we are partially successful 
                                                 
12  While a negative correlation is expected due to the role of accounting accruals to smooth the variability of 
cash flows (Dechow 1994), excessive values are generally interpreted to be indicative of earnings management 
(e.g., Burgstahler et al. 2006; Myers et al. 2007). In contrast, more timely gain and loss recognition should 
attenuate the negative correlation between accruals and cash flows (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
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in reducing differences between the two groups of firms, as the similarity for most of the 
covariates increases (e.g., size, foreign sales, medium and high tech industry, leverage), but 
statistical differences still remain. This highlights the general issue of a limited number of good 
matching candidates in a single-country setting (Christensen et al. 2015). To mitigate the 
impact of these differences on earnings quality, we include all the covariates as control 
variables when constructing our earnings quality metrics. 
6.3. IFRS firm types and earnings quality 
Table 4 Panel A reports the results for the comparison of earnings quality by different 
types of firms in the post-IFRS-adoption period and with the average earnings quality of 
German GAAP firms over the sample period.13 Results indicate that firms in the EQUITY 
cluster exhibit higher earnings quality than German GAAP firms. Specifically, EQUITY firms 
engage less in income smoothing behaviour as reflected in a higher earnings variability (0.0085 
versus 0.0035), higher variability of earnings relative to variability of cash flows (0.7535 versus 
0.6485) and a less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows (-0.6956 versus -
0.7509). These results are also statistically significant. Furthermore, as indicated by the 
negative and significant coefficient on SPOS both in the standard regression (-0.0066) and in 
the Reverse regression (-0.0237), EQUITY firms manage less frequently towards small positive 
profits than German GAAP firms. LNEG is positive and highly significant, indicating more 
timely loss recognition relative to German GAAP firms.  
{Insert Table 4} 
Firms belonging to the DEBT cluster generally do not appear to have a higher earnings 
quality than German GAAP firms, at least in terms of income smoothing. They show 
                                                 
13  We also report results using the raw variables (ΔNI, ΔCF, ACC, CF) as inputs for the computation of our 
earnings quality proxies rather than their residuals. Since results are very similar, we focus our discussion on 
the metrics based on residuals, which are indicated with a star. 
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significantly lower earnings variability (0.0014 versus 0.0035) and a significantly lower ratio 
of earnings variability relative to cash flow variability (0.4146 versus 0.6485) than German 
GAAP firms. The correlation between accruals and cash flows is insignificantly less negative 
for DEBT firms (-0.7535 versus -0.7509). The coefficient on SPOS is negative (-0.0171; -
0.0966 in the Reverse regression) and statistically significant suggesting that DEBT firms 
engage less in earnings management by turning small losses into small profits. The coefficient 
on LNEG is positive (0.0077), but insignificant, indicating no significant differences in timely 
loss recognition between DEBT and German GAAP firms. 
Firms in the FINCON-PE cluster exhibit significantly higher earnings variability than 
German GAAP firms (0.0064 versus 0.0035). However, while the differences in the other 
metrics also indicate higher earnings quality for FINCON-PE firms, the results are statistically 
insignificant.  
Finally, REPUTATION firms do not differ significantly from German GAAP firms in 
terms of income smoothing. Except for earnings variability, REPUTATION firms have a 
higher ratio of volatility of earnings to volatility of cash flows (0.6979 versus 0.6485), and a 
less negative correlation between accruals and cash flows (-0.7259 versus -0.7509), though 
none of the results is statistically significant. The coefficients on SPOS and LNEG have the 
expected signs, but only SPOS (-0.0161; -0.0611 in the Reverse regression) is significantly 
different from zero suggesting that REPUTATION firms manage earnings less towards small 
profits.  
In the right part of Table 4 Panel A, we report direct comparisons of earnings quality across 
different types of firms. Generally, based on our empirical proxies EQUITY firms appear to 
have the highest earnings quality consistent with these firms facing the greatest demand for 
high FRQ. Contrary to our expectations, DEBT firms exhibit the lowest earnings quality 
probably because their controlling owners prefer less reporting transparency to protect their 
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private benefits of control. Overall, these findings are consistent with different reporting 
incentives across the different types of IFRS adopting firms, but there is little evidence that 
IFRS firms in general have higher earnings quality than average German GAAP firms. 
Although the previous findings suggest that only EQUITY firms exhibit consistently 
higher earnings quality, it is possible that upon IFRS adoption all adopting firms experience an 
improvement in earnings quality relative to German GAAP accounting. Specifically, due to 
their changing economics, these firms might have been constrained in portraying their 
economic performance under German GAAP and they can mitigate this problem by adopting 
IFRS. In order to investigate this further, we perform a pre- and post-adoption analysis for the 
different IFRS firm types for which data are available.  
Table 4 Panel B reveals that EQUITY firms evidence the most significant improvements 
in earnings quality. In particular, the variability of earnings and the variability of earnings 
relative to the variability of cash flows increase, while the negative correlation between 
accruals and cash flows is reduced in the post-adoption period. These changes are statistically 
significant and imply reduced earnings management. The insignificant results for SPOS and 
LNEG are likely due to lack of power given the small sample size.14 In contrast, DEBT and 
FINCON-PE firms do not exhibit improvements in their earnings quality. Interestingly, 
REPUTATION firms show significant improvements in two of the three income smoothing 
metrics and a lower incidence of small positive profits in the post-adoption period. Taken 
together with the findings in Panel A, these results suggest that REPUTATION firms have 
lower earnings quality than average German GAAP firms in the pre-adoption period, but catch 
up after the adoption of IFRS. One interpretation of these findings is that these firms are better 
                                                 
14  The Reverse specifications of SPOS and LNEG yield similar results across all clusters in the Pre-Post analyses. 
Therefore, we do not present them separately in Panel B of Table 4. 
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able to show economic performance in financial statements by applying IFRS, because they 
were constrained in their German GAAP reporting.  
In sum, these results suggest that different motivations to adopt IFRS yield different 
earnings quality effects. Importantly, the results by firm types imply that individual variables 
like size, leverage, sales growth, and profitability are only incomplete measures of reporting 
incentives. For example, individually, larger size or higher leverage is generally associated 
with stronger reporting incentives. However, in our study it is the smallest firms with the lowest 
leverage that experience the most significant changes in reporting behaviour. This highlights 
the importance of examining the interrelation between different incentive variables. 
6.4. The incremental effect of IFRS on earnings quality 
Some of the previous results suggest that IFRS adoption might help firms to better portray 
their economic performance. In this section, we attempt to identify the incremental effect of 
IFRS using a matched sample design. Table 5 Panel A presents the comparison of earnings 
quality for matched IFRS and German GAAP firms in the post-adoption period. For brevity, 
we focus our discussion on the main implications of the results. They generally indicate that 
IFRS adopting firms have (marginally) higher earnings quality than German GAAP firms. 
Specifically, IFRS firms evidence less income smoothing, less earnings management toward 
small net income, and more timely loss recognition. However, findings for the correlation 
between accruals and cash flows are statistically insignificant. 
In Table 5 Panel B, we turn to the comparison of earnings quality changes around IFRS 
adoption for IFRS and German GAAP firms. As regards the income smoothing metrics, IFRS 
firms generally exhibit less smoothing after IFRS adoption. In contrast, the control firms show 
the same level of income smoothing. The coefficient on small positive profits is negative for 
IFRS and positive for German GAAP in both the standard Barth et al. (2008) and the Reverse 
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specification, but these results are statistically insignificant. Finally, the frequency of large 
negative net income is significantly higher in the post-adoption period for IFRS adopting firms, 
but not for the control group. 
{Insert Table 5 about here} 
Finally, Table 5 Panel C reports the results for the differences-in-differences analysis. The 
signs of the differences generally indicate that IFRS firms evidence larger improvements in 
earnings quality than German GAAP firms. However, most of the findings are statistically 
insignificant, which is likely to be attributable to low statistical power arising from estimation 
error (Barth et al. 2008). Taken together, the results in Table 5 are consistent with the notion 
of accounting standards (IFRS) having an effect on private firms' earnings quality. However, 
even though we match firms on a number of observables and include them as controls in 
constructing our earnings quality metrics, we cannot rule out the possibility that the remaining 
differences in the covariates drive our findings. Therefore, these results should be interpreted 
with caution. 
 
7.  Empirical analyses of disclosure quality 
Taken at face value our findings so far might suggest that most (non-EQUITY) IFRS 
private firms adopt IFRS merely as a label, because they do not exhibit significant changes in 
their earnings properties. However, at least two objections can be made against this argument. 
First, as outlined before, IFRS adoption can still make financial statements more informative, 
if it increases comparability with other IFRS peer firms. Second, and more importantly, the 
earnings quality metrics used above only insufficiently capture overall FRQ of private firms. 
To address the latter issue, we compare disclosure practices of IFRS adopting firms with that 




7.1.1. Disclosure proxies 
We construct three sets of proxies to measure the disclosure practices of private firms. 
First, we count the number of pages for the annual report (AR Pages), the notes (Notes Pages) 
as well as the management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section (MD&A Pages). Second, 
since page numbers is a crude (albeit often used) proxy and potentially influenced by 
boilerplate-type disclosure, we further construct a Disclosure_Content1 score to capture the 
level of disclosure detail. Thereby we focus on deferred taxes and goodwill, two financial items 
that are particularly different in their accounting treatment under IFRS and German GAAP. 
Disclosure_Content1 is computed as the sum of eight dummy variables indicating whether 
deferred taxes and goodwill are presented on the balance sheet (deferred_tax_presented and 
goodwill_presented), whether the deferred taxes and goodwill are explained in the notes 
(deferred_tax_expl_notes and goodwill_expl_notes), whether the number of pages spent on 
explaining the deferred tax item and goodwill in the notes are above the sample median 
(deferred_tax_pages > sample median and goodwill_expl_pages > sample median), whether 
there is a breakdown into deferred tax assets and liabilities (deferred_tax_breakdown), whether 
the average tax rate applicable to the company is disclosed (tax_rate_disclosed). We also 
compute Disclosure_Content2 only for firm observations where the notes contain information 
on deferred taxes (i.e., deferred_tax_expl_notes = 1) and on goodwill (i.e., 
goodwill_expl_notes = 1). This more restricted score aims to compare only those firm 
observations where both deferred tax and goodwill are sufficiently significant accounting items 
to be discussed in the notes.  
Third, we create a dummy variable, Website, taking the value of 1 for firms that publish 
their financial report on their website, and zero otherwise. We use this dummy variable to test 
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whether IFRS firms go beyond legal disclosure requirements that mandate firms to file their 
financial reports with the German corporate register.15  
7.1.2. Multivariate regression design 
We first estimate the following OLS model for the post-adoption period for the matched 
sample of IFRS and German GAAP firms: 
 Disclosure = β0+ β1IFRS + β2Website + ∑βjControlsj     (1) 
Disclosure stands for the first two sets of continuous proxies capturing the quantity and 
detail of disclosure (i.e., AR Pages, Notes Pages, MD&A Pages, Disclosure Content1, 
Disclosure Content2). IFRS is a dummy variable coded as 1 (0) for IFRS adopting (German 
GAAP) firms. We also include the dummy variable Website to control for the fact that annual 
reports published on firms’ websites can contain marketing, advertising and other non-financial 
information, while reports published through the Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger do not. 
Controlsj denotes all firm-specific variables from Table 2, since they have been found to be 
associated with firms’ disclosure choices (e.g., Leuz 2000; Beuselinck et al. 2008), industry- 
and year-fixed effects. In addition, we include Capital intensity, computed as net property plant 
and equipment divided by total assets, to proxy for proprietary costs of disclosure (e.g., Leuz 
2000). We run equation (1) for the pooled sample and the different firm types separately. 
For firms with pre- and post-adoption data available, we perform a differences-in-
differences test by including a Post dummy, coded as 1 (0) for years after (before) IFRS 
adoption, and the interaction term IFRS*Post in equation (1). In this specification, the 
coefficient on the interaction term captures the extent disclosures have changed for IFRS firms 
in the post-adoption period relative to the matched German GAAP firms. 
                                                 
15  Firms whose equity or debt is traded on a regulated market must publish their reports on the corporate website. 
We take this into account in our multivariate analyses. 
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Finally, to test whether IFRS firms have a higher propensity to publish their financial 
reports on their websites than German GAAP firms, we estimate the following probit model 
(due to limited data availability only for the post-adoption period): 
 Website = β0+ β1IFRS + ∑βjControlsj        (2) 
7.2. Descriptive statistics of disclosure variables  
Table 6 reveals that the total number of pages of the annual report amounts to 82 in the 
mean for IFRS firms, while this number corresponds to only 31 for the German GAAP sample. 
In addition, the notes and the MD&A sections include 32 and 16 pages in the mean for the 
IFRS firms, respectively, which is considerably higher than for the German GAAP firms (7 
pages, respectively).16 Furthermore, the disclosure content scores are significantly higher for 
IFRS firms suggesting that their financial reports contain more detail regarding deferred taxes 
and goodwill than German GAAP reports.  
{Insert Table 6 about here} 
As Table 6 further shows, 56 percent of IFRS firms publish the financial report on their 
website, which is a significantly higher share than for German GAAP firms (23 percent). Not 
surprisingly, primarily EQUITY and DEBT IFRS firms make their financial reports available 
online. For FINCON-PE firms there is no significant difference between IFRS and German 
GAAP firms. However, REPUTATION firms are significantly more likely to put their reports 
on the website than their matched German GAAP counterparts. 
 
 
                                                 
16  These large differences are to some extent attributable to the fact that annual reports published on websites are 
significantly longer than those submitted to the Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger. We take this into account in 
our multivariate analyses. 
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7.3. Multivariate disclosure analyses  
Models (1) to (3) of Table 7 report results on the quantity of disclosures provided in the 
financial reports of IFRS versus German GAAP firms in the post-adoption period. Panel A 
shows that financial reports as well as notes sections contained in the financial reports of IFRS 
firms are significantly longer (as measured by page number) than those of German GAAP 
firms. These results are reinforced by Panel B indicating that each type of IFRS adopters has 
longer annual reports and notes sections than their German GAAP counterparts.17 The 
comparison across incentive clusters does not show a consistent pattern for the length of the 
annual report (sections). IFRS firms generally do not have significantly longer MD&A sections 
than German GAAP firms (Panel A), except for DEBT and FINCON-PE firms (Panel B). 
However, this is not surprising given that the inclusion of MD&A is not an IFRS-specific 
requirement. Overall, these results show increased disclosure by IFRS firms which is likely to 
be attributable to the stronger IFRS disclosure requirements that provide less room for 
managerial discretion and are easier to verify for auditors by using checklists (compared to 
earnings metrics). However, the use of checklists bears the risk of a “tick box” mentality, where 
firms merely increase boilerplate disclosure (Daske et al. 2013; Christensen et al. 2015).  
{Insert Table 7 about here} 
Therefore, in Models (4) and (5) of Table 7 we test whether IFRS firms also increase the 
level of detail of disclosure. As indicated by the positive and significant coefficients on 
Disclosure_Content1 and Disclosure_Content2 in Panel A, IFRS financial reports contain 
significantly more detailed information in the notes than German GAAP financial reports. 
Panel B shows that each type of IFRS adopters provides more detail in their notes sections 
                                                 
17  In Panel B, because of high correlation, we exclude IPO in the EQUITY cluster, rating and bonds in the DEBT 
cluster, and peown in the FINCON-PE cluster. For presentational purposes, we only display the results for the 
IFRS coefficient for each cluster and regression, respectively. 
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relative to their German GAAP counterparts.18 It also reveals that the difference in disclosure 
detail (Disclosure_Content1 and Disclosure_Content2) is most (least) pronounced for 
EQUITY (REPUTATION) firms, consistent with these firms having stronger (weaker) 
reporting incentives.  
Table 8 shows the results for a differences-in-differences analysis of the disclosure 
practices of IFRS firms with that of German GAAP firms. We find that adopting firms increase 
the amount and detail of disclosure specifically in the post-adoption period (positive and 
significant coefficient on IFRS*Post, except for MD&A).19 In untabulated regressions we find 
similar results when we exclude EQUITY and DEBT firms, suggesting that increased 
disclosure following IFRS adoption is not solely driven by capital market oriented firms. In 
sum, the findings from Table 7 and 8 suggest that IFRS firms increase both the quantity and 
the level of detail of disclosure. 
{Insert Table 8 about here} 
Table 9 shows that IFRS firms are more likely to publish their financial reports online than 
German GAAP firms in the post-adoption period (Model (1)). Furthermore, Models (2) to (5) 
indicate that across all clusters IFRS firms have higher propensities to use their website as a 
disclosure channel for their financial reports.20 Notably, the result for REPUTATION firms 
suggests that even in the absence of (expected) capital market transactions IFRS firms are more 
likely to make annual reports available on their website than German GAAP firms. Overall, 
these findings can be interpreted as private firms committing to transparency, especially against 
                                                 
18  In Panel B, because of high correlation with the IFRS dummy, we exclude IPO in the EQUITY cluster, rating 
and bonds in the DEBT cluster, and peown in the FINCON-PE cluster. For presentational purposes, we only 
display the results for the IFRS coefficient for each cluster and regression, respectively. 
19  Because of the small sample size, we cannot run this analysis for each cluster separately. 
20  Due to high correlation with the IFRS dummy, we exclude IPO for the EQUITY firms (Model (2)), rating and 
bonds for the DEBT firms (Model (3)), and peown in the FINCON-PE cluster. 
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the background that German private firms historically were reluctant to make their annual 
reports public even when they were legally required to so (Bernard et al. 2017). 
Taken together, the results of our disclosure analyses suggest that all IFRS firms improve 
their disclosure in terms of quantity and level of detail following the accounting switch. These 
findings mitigate the concern that private firms merely adopt a label, as one might conclude 
from our earnings quality analyses. However, the observed changes in disclosures are not only 
the effect of the increased disclosure requirements under IFRS, but also the result of a greater 
commitment to transparency of IFRS firms as evidenced by the greater willingness to publish 
annual reports on their websites. 
{Insert Table 9 about here} 
8. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate FRQ of German private firms around the voluntary adoption 
of IFRS across two dimensions, earnings quality and disclosure practices. We are particularly 
interested in the financial reporting consequences of the different motivations of private firms 
to adopt IFRS. To gauge private firms’ motivations for IFRS adoption empirically, we use 
factor and cluster analyses based on a comprehensive set of firm characteristics and observable 
economic events that occur concurrently around IFRS adoption. We identify four types of firms 
that differ primarily in the level of capital market orientation, life cycle, internationalization, 
corporate governance (as captured by legal form and ownership type), and financial condition.  
Our results indicate that higher earnings quality (improvements) are confined to one type 
of firms that are young, fast growing and seeking immediate access to the public equity markets 
consistent with these firms benefitting most from increasing transparency. Recognizing that 
our earnings quality metrics are only incomplete measures of reporting quality, we additionally 
compare the disclosure practices of IFRS and German GAAP firms. Our results show that IFRS 
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adopting firms are more likely to publish the financial reports on their website and they 
significantly increase the quantity and detail in disclosure. An important implication of this 
finding is that failure to identify changes of particular aspects of earnings quality around IFRS 
adoption cannot be per se interpreted as (private) firms generally not improving their FRQ. 
Taken together, our earnings quality and disclosure tests suggest that IFRS adopting firms 
increase FRQ relative to German GAAP reporting firms. However, different incentives for the 
adoption decision result in firms changing different dimensions of FRQ presumably to tailor 
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In order to construct our empirical metrics, we follow the methodology outlined in Barth 
et al. (2008). Earnings variability is measured as the variance of the residuals from the 
following regression21: 
 ∆𝑁𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡   
           + 𝛼5𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (1) 
where ΔNI is the change in net income; Size is the natural logarithm of total assets; Sales 
growth is the actual growth in sales; Financial Leverage is end of year total liabilities divided 
by end of year equity book value; CF is annual cash flow from operating activities divided by 
end of year total assets. We compute operating cash flows indirectly by subtracting accruals 
from net income before extraordinary items22; Big5 is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm is audited either by BDO, Deloitte, Ernst&Young, KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
or their predecessors, and zero otherwise; Foreign Sales is the percentage share of foreign sales. 
Using the residuals from this regression rather than the raw numbers mitigates the effects of 
differences in firm performance and financial statement verification (Big5). We acknowledge 
that to some degree the controls possibly capture reporting incentives. This could limit our 
ability to observe differences in earnings quality across different groups of firms.  
Higher earnings variability might simply reflect higher volatility of the underlying cash 
flows rather than higher earnings quality. Therefore, our second earnings smoothing metric 
relates the variability of changes in net income to the variability of the changes in cash flows. 
It is computed as the ratio of standard deviation of the change in net income, ΔNI, divided by 
                                                 
21  We also report results for empirical earnings quality proxies using raw values of input variables. A potential 
issue with the Barth et al. (2008) methodology is that the control variables, e.g., in equation (1), control for 
the level of changes in net income and not for their respective impact on the respective earnings quality proxy, 
i.e., variability in net income. 




the standard deviation of the change in operating cash flows, ΔCF. Again, we obtain the 
residuals from the following regression: 
 ∆𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡   
           + 𝛼5𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (2) 
Our third earnings smoothing measure is the contemporaneous Spearman correlation 
between accruals, ACC, and cash flows from operating activities, CF. We apply the same 
procedure as above, and compare the correlations of the residuals obtained from the following 
regressions: 
 𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 +   
           + 𝛼4𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼5𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (3) 
 𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡   
           + 𝛼5𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡      (4) 
Our measure of managing earnings towards a target, i.e., small positive earnings, is 
captured by the coefficient on small positive net income, SPOS, in the following regression 
(Barth et al. 2008):  
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆(0,1)𝑖𝑡 /𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇(0,1)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡    
                                          + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +
                                               + 𝛼7𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (5a) 
 
and a “reverse” specification: 
𝑆𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆(0,1)𝑖𝑡 /𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇(0,1)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡    
             + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
                  + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          (5b) 
where IFRS(0,1) is an indicator variable that equals one for IFRS firms and zero otherwise. 
POST(0,1) is an indicator variable that equals one (zero) for IFRS firms for the post-adoption 
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(pre-adoption) period. SPOS is an indicator variable that equals one if net income scaled by 
total assets is between 0 and 0.01. When we compare IFRS firms (using post-adoption 
observations) with German GAAP firms, IFRS(0,1) is the dependent variable. In this analysis, 
a negative coefficient on SPOS indicates that German GAAP firms manage toward small 
positive profits more frequently than IFRS firms. For the pre- and post-analysis of IFRS firms 
we use POST(0,1) as a dependent variable. In this case, a negative coefficient on SPOS 
indicates that IFRS firms manage earnings toward small positive profits less frequently in the 
post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period. We also estimate the “reverse” 
specification (5b) where SPOS is the dependent variable, because it more directly captures the 
likelihood of the occurrence of small positive profits. 
Finally, we measure timely loss recognition as the coefficient on large negative net 
income, LNEG, in the following regression (Barth et al. 2008): 
𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆(0,1)𝑖𝑡 /𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇(0,1)𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡    
                                          + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +
                                               + 𝛼7𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (6a) 
and a “reverse” specification: 
𝐿𝑁𝐸𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐼𝐹𝑅𝑆(0,1)𝑖𝑡 /𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇(0,1)𝑖𝑡  + 𝛼2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡    
             + 𝛼4𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5𝐶𝐹𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼6𝐵𝑖𝑔5𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼7𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
                  + ∑ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠  +  𝜀𝑖𝑡          (6b) 
where LNEG is an indicator variable that equals one for observations for which annual net 
income scaled by total assets is less than -0.20 and zero otherwise. When comparing IFRS 
firms with German GAAP firms (IFRS(0,1) is the dependent variable), a positive coefficient 
on LNEG indicates that IFRS firms recognize large losses more frequently than German GAAP 
firms. When comparing the pre-adoption and post-adoption period of IFRS firms (POST(0,1) 
is the dependent variable), a positive coefficient then indicates that IFRS firms recognize large 
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losses more frequently in the post-adoption period than in the pre-adoption period. Again, we 
also estimate the “reverse” specification (6b) where LNEG is the dependent variable, because 
it more directly captures the likelihood of the occurrence of large losses. 
Following Barth et al. (2008), we compare several earnings quality metrics across different 
firm partitions. We interpret differences in various summary statistics related to the accounting 
metrics between the samples of firms as evidence of differences in earnings quality. We test 
for differences in each income smoothing metric using a t-test based on the empirical 
distribution of differences. Specifically, we first randomly select firm observations with 
replacement that we assign to one or the other type of the firm, depending on the test. Then, 
we calculate the difference between the two types of firms for each metric. We obtain the 





Changes in Firm Characteristics around IFRS Adoption 
Notes: This figure shows the evolution of several key characteristics during a 10-year period around IFRS adoption 
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Sample Selection Procedure 
 
Notes: This table reports the sample selection procedure. To investigate the reporting choices of private parent 
firms in their consolidated financial statements, we search the August 2011 version of Hoppenstedt-Bilanzen. 
Information on firms that went private before August 2011 is retrieved from Hoppenstedt-Aktienführer and the 
website of the German Association of Investors (Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger, sdk.org). Going-public 
(IPO) firms are non-financial parent firms that went public on a regulated German stock exchange in the period 
from 2001 to October 2010. IPO data are obtained from the website of the Deutsche Börse Group (deutsche-
boerse.com). Going-private and going-public firms are classified as German GAAP or IFRS firm depending on 
the set of accounting standards applied in the going-private year and IPO year, respectively. To collect information 
on firms’ IFRS switch years and ownership structure in the IFRS adoption year, we use various data sources 
including the ”Wer gehört zu wem?” database of the Commerzbank AG, Hoppenstedt-Bilanzen, firms’ annual 
reports and an extensive web search. 
Depending on data availability, the number of observations can vary across our empirical tests. We attempt to use 
the maximum number of observations available per empirical test. To provide full transparency, we indicate which 
sample is used in the different analyses presented in subsequent tables. Table 4 Panel A compares the earnings 
quality of different types of IFRS adopting private firms in the post-adoption period with the average earnings 
quality of a comprehensive sample of German GAAP firms over the sample period. Table 4 Panel B examines 
changes in earnings quality measures for the different IFRS adopting firm types from the pre- to post-adoption 
period. Table 5 compares earnings quality for a propensity score-matched sample of German GAAP and IFRS 
firms in the post-adoption period (Panel A), changes in earnings quality from the pre- to post-adoption period 
(Panel B), and using a differences-in-differences design (Panel C). Table 7 examines disclosure practices a 
propensity score-matched sample of German GAAP and IFRS firms in the post-adoption period. Table 8 examines 
the disclosure practices for German GAAP and IFRS firms in the pre-and post-adoption period. Table 9 analyzes 
the disclosure channels for German GAAP and IFRS firms in the post-adoption period. 
 
  
Sample selection and composition Total IFRS  German GAAP
Firms on Hoppenstedt-Bilanzen that meet the following selection criteria:
Equity shares are not listed on a stock exchange, non-financial firm, consolidated financial 
statements in German GAAP or IFRS, and financial statement data available after 1998 3,328     345      2,983             
Less going-private firms 251        157      94                  
Plus going-public (IPO) firms 87          85        2                    
Initial sample 3,164     273      2,891             
   No. of firms used in factor and cluster analyses (Table 2) 273      -   
   Max no. of firms used in earnings quality analyses (Table 4) 228      1,986             
   Max no. of firms used in disclosure analyses (Tables 6 to 9) 140      140                
Distribution of observations across empirical analyses
Earnings quality sample Total IFRS  German GAAP
Table 4 sample - Earnings quality 
Panel A - Post-adoption period 10,281   784      9,497             
Panel B - Pre- and Post-adoption period 719        719      -   
Table 5 sample - Earnings quality (Propensity score method)
Panel A - Post adoption period 1,018     509      509                
Panel B - Pre- and Post-adoption period 856        428      428                
Panel C - DID analyses 856        428      428                
Disclosure quality sample
Table 7 sample - Disclosure practices (Post-adoption period) 711        362      349                
Table 8 sample - Disclosure practices (DID analyses) 178        108      70                  



























Size -0.4158 0.4339 0.3044
Sales Growth 0.3032
Leverage 0.5231









Medium and High Tech Industry 0.3730
Age -0.4193
Panel B: Factor Scores and Firm Characteristics by Clusters 
EQUITY DEBT FINCON-PE REPUTATION Average
Factor scores
Equity market orientation 0.98 -0.21 -0.46 -0.61
Debt market orientation -0.28 1.92 -0.26 -0.28
Financial condition -0.15 0.04 0.87 -0.43
International activity -0.05 0.20 -0.16 0.07
Firm characteristics
Size 4.25 7.55 5.85 5.79 5.51
Sales Growth 0.56 0.24 0.39 0.13 0.34
Leverage 0.60 0.74 0.86 0.65 0.69
Return on Assets 0.05 0.04 -0.01 0.07 0.04
Foreign Sales 39.78 50.58 30.49 42.18 39.90
Big5 0.31 0.68 0.34 0.33 0.37
Stock Corporation 0.98 0.47 0.12 0.44 0.55
Medium and High Tech Industry 0.38 0.29 0.27 0.29 0.32
Age 15.80 53.34 39.77 57.95 39.39
IPO 1.00 0.35 0.29 0.03 0.45
Rating 0.00 0.85 0.02 0.01 0.11
Bonds 0.09 0.79 0.02 0.02 0.14
Profit Participation Certificates 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01
PE Ownership 0.44 0.47 0.88 0.09 0.42






TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Notes: This table presents results for our factor analysis (Panel A) and cluster analysis (Panel B) that are used to 
identify different types of IFRS adopting firms. Panel C shows the distribution of post-adoption firm-years by 
different types of IFRS adopting firms. EQUITY labels young, fast growing equity market oriented firms. DEBT 
denotes large, mature debt market oriented firms. FINCON-PEs are firms with a weak financial condition that in 
most cases are owned by a private equity sponsor. REPUTATION labels mature, highly profitable firms with 
substantial international activities. Size = natural logarithm of total assets; Leverage = ratio of total liabilities to 
total assets; Foreign Sales = fraction of sales generated outside of Germany; Big5 = dummy variable taking the 
value one if a firm is audited by a Big5 audit company, and zero otherwise. Big5 auditors are BDO, Deloitte, 
Ernst&Young, KPMG, PriceWaterhouseCoopers and their predecessors. Stock Corporation = dummy variable 
taking the value one if a firm is registered as a stock corporation, and zero otherwise; Medium and High Tech 
Industry = dummy variable taking the value one if a firm operates in a medium or high tech industry, and zero 
otherwise; Age is the years since foundation of the firm (Source: Hoppenstedt-Bilanzen); IPO = dummy variable 
taking the value one if a firm plans an IPO, cancels an IPO, or completes an IPO between 2001 and 2010, or will 
do so during the next three years. Otherwise, the dummy variable is zero. Data on planned IPOs are gathered from 
IPO surveys published by GoingPublic Magazin and German Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(Bundesverband Deutscher Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften e. V. (BVK)) and an extensive web search; data on 
cancelled IPOs are gathered (1) by matching lists on IPOs planned and IPOs completed and (2) a supplemental 
web search; data on completed IPOs between 2001 and October 2010 are obtained from the website of the 
Deutsche Börse Group (deutsche-boerse.com); Rating = dummy variable taking the value one if a firm has a 
rating; Bonds (Profit Participation Certificates) = dummy variable taking the value one if a firm has a bond 
outstanding (has a profit participation right outstanding) or will do so during the future three years. Otherwise, the 
dummy variable is zero. Data on bonds and profit participation rights (PPC) are taken from Datastream; PE 
Ownership = dummy variable taking the value one if a firm is controlled by private equity investors, and zero 
otherwise. Data on private equity investments in Germany are collected from 2005 to 2010 and obtained from 
Majunke Consulting.  
 
Panel C: Distribution of IFRS Post-Adoption Firm-year Observations
N % Cum. % N % Cum. % N % Cum. % N % Cum. % N % Cum. %
1999 5 0.64 0.64 5 1.69 1.69 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0 0.00 0.00
2000 12 1.53 2.17 11 3.72 5.41 0 0.00 0.00 1 0.98 0.98 0 0.00 0.00
2001 14 1.79 3.95 11 3.72 9.12 2 1.28 1.28 1 0.98 1.96 0 0.00 0.00
2002 19 2.42 6.38 12 4.05 13.18 4 2.56 3.85 1 0.98 2.94 2 0.87 0.87
2003 22 2.81 9.18 12 4.05 17.23 6 3.85 7.69 1 0.98 3.92 3 1.3 2.17
2004 39 4.97 14.16 22 7.43 24.66 9 5.77 13.46 1 0.98 4.9 7 3.04 5.22
2005 57 7.27 21.43 30 10.14 34.8 15 9.62 23.08 3 2.94 7.84 9 3.91 9.13
2006 110 14.03 35.46 47 15.88 50.68 22 14.1 37.18 11 10.78 18.63 30 13.04 22.17
2007 144 18.37 53.83 57 19.26 69.93 24 15.38 52.56 17 16.67 35.29 46 20 42.17
2008 174 22.19 76.02 53 17.91 87.84 31 19.87 72.44 29 28.43 63.73 61 26.52 68.7
2009 145 18.49 94.52 31 10.47 98.31 28 17.95 90.38 29 28.43 92.16 57 24.78 93.48
2010 43 5.48 100.00 5 1.69 100.00 15 9.62 100.00 8 7.84 100.00 15 6.52 100.00
Total 784 100.00 296 37.76 156 19.90 102 13.01 230 29.34
































Panel A: Descriptive statistics for the full sample
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Test variables
ΔNI 1,168 0.01 0.01 0.07 9,497 0.00** 0.00*** 0.06
ΔCF 867 0.01 0.02 0.21 7,170 0.00 0.00 0.17
ACC 1,168 -0.03 -0.04 0.19 9,497 -0.05*** -0.05*** 0.13
CF 1,168 0.10 0.10 0.21 9,497 0.11*** 0.10* 0.16
SPOS 1,168 0.06 0.00 0.24 9,497 0.10*** 0.00*** 0.31
LNEG 1,168 0.03 0.00 0.18 9,497 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.09
Incentive and Control variables
Size 1,168 19.82 19.91 1.94 9,497 18.87*** 18.71** 1.28
Leverage 1,168 0.67 0.70 0.20 9,497 0.66 0.68*** 0.19
Sales Growth 1,158 0.24 0.08 0.56 9,494 0.12*** 0.04*** 0.37
Foreign Sales 1,168 45.14 48.00 34.04 9,497 21.73*** 3.00*** 27.53
Big5 1,168 0.72 1.00 0.45 9,497 0.46*** 0.00*** 0.50
Stock Corporation 1,168 0.63 1.00 0.48 9,497 0.19*** 0.00*** 0.39
Medium and High Tech Industry 1,168 0.34 0.00 0.47 9,497 0.12*** 0.00*** 0.33
Age 1,160 49.39 25.00 54.25 7,157 49.44 32.00*** 49.98
IPO 1,168 0.43 0.00 0.50 9,497 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.06
Rating 1,168 0.17 0.00 0.38 9,497 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.10
Bonds 1,168 0.21 0.00 0.41 9,497 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.07
Profit Participation Certificates 1,168 0.04 0.00 0.18 9,497 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.06




TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on the variables used in the empirical analyses of earnings quality. 
Panel A shows descriptive statistics for the full sample used in Table 4, Panel B for the propensity score-matched 
sample used in Table 5. Financial statement data are retrieved from Hoppenstedt-Bilanzen. N indicates the number of 
firm-year observations. Test variables: ΔNI = change in net income; ΔCF = change in cash flow from operations; 
ACC = accruals; CF = annual cash flow from operating activities divided by end of year total assets; SPOS = indicator 
variable that equals one if net income scaled by total assets is between 0 and 0.01; LNEG = indicator variable that 
equals one for observations for which annual net income scaled by total assets is less than -0.20 and zero otherwise. 
Incentive and control variables are defined in Table 2. Continuous variables are winsorized at the one percent level in 
both tails of the distribution. Mean (median) differences between IFRS and German GAAP firms are tested by 










Panel B: Descriptive statistics for the propensity score-matched sample
N Mean Median SD N Mean Median SD
Test variables
ΔNI 755 0.01 0.01 0.06 755 0.00*** 0.00** 0.06
ΔCF 500 0.01 0.01 0.21 500 0.01 0.01 0.17
ACC 755 -0.04 -0.05 0.19 755 -0.05* -0.05 0.14
CF 755 0.11 0.10 0.20 755 0.11 0.11* 0.15
SPOS 755 0.06 0.00 0.23 755 0.11*** 0.00** 0.31
LNEG 755 0.02 0.00 0.13 755 0.01*** 0.00* 0.11
Incentive and Control variables
Size 755 20.05 20.11 1.93 755 20.18 19.79 1.88
Leverage 755 0.67 0.70 0.19 755 0.72*** 0.71*** 0.19
Sales Growth 751 0.24 0.09 0.54 755 0.13*** 0.05*** 0.42
Foreign Sales 755 44.36 47.00 34.16 755 40.64** 42.00** 34.30
Big5 755 0.74 1.00 0.44 755 0.64*** 1.00*** 0.48
Stock Corporation 755 0.58 1.00 0.49 755 0.52** 1.00** 0.50
Medium and High Tech Industry 755 0.30 0.00 0.46 755 0.19*** 0.00*** 0.39
Age 755 49.50 25.00 53.94 755 55.24** 32.00*** 52.75
IPO 755 0.37 0.00 0.48 755 0.05*** 0.00*** 0.22
Rating 755 0.22 0.00 0.42 755 0.01*** 0.00*** 0.08
Bonds 755 0.23 0.00 0.42 755 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05
Profit Participation Certificates 755 0.03 0.00 0.16 755 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.05





IFRS and Earnings Quality by Type of IFRS Adopting Firms 
Panel A: Post-adoption period 
Variability of ΔNI* (ΔNI) EQUITY (1) DEBT (2) FINCON-PE (3) REPUT. (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(1) (3)-(4) (4)-(2)
IFRS (a) 0.0085 (0.0095) 0.0014 (0.0015) 0.0064 (0.0057) 0.0035 (0.0036) 0.0071*** -0.0021 0.0028*** 0.0021*** 
N 293 (296) 156 (156) 102 (102) 229 (230)  (0.0080***) (-0.0037***) (0.0021**) (0.0021***)
German GAAP (b)
N
Difference (a) - (b) 0.0050*** (0.0058***) -0.0021*** (-0.0022***) 0.0029*** (0.0021) 0.0001 (-0.0001)
Variability of ΔNI* (ΔNI) over ΔCF* (ΔCF) EQUITY (1) DEBT (2) FINCON-PE (3) REPUT. (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(1) (3)-(4) (4)-(2)
IFRS (a) 0.7535 (0.5968) 0.4146 (0.3212) 0.6807 (0.5083) 0.6979 (0.4664) 0.3374*** -0.0725 -0.0163 0.2813***
N 276 (276) 139 (139) 73 (73) 189 (189) (0.2756***) (-0.1871) (0.0419)  (0.1452***)
German GAAP (b)
N
Difference (a) - (b) 0.1050*** (0.1495***) -0.2323*** (-0.1261***) 0.0326 (0.0610) 0.0489 (0.0191)
Correlation of ACC* (ACC) and CF* (CF) EQUITY (1) DEBT (2) FINCON-PE (3) REPUT. (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(1) (3)-(4) (4)-(2)
IFRS (a) -0.6956 (-0.6822) -0.7535 (-0.7241) -0.7465 (-0.7629) -0.7259 (-0.7338) 0.0539 -0.0509 -0.0195 0.0225
N 292 (292) 156 (156) 101 (102) 228 (229) (0.0420) (-0.0387)  (-0.0291) (-0.0096)
German GAAP (b)
N
Difference (a) - (b) 0.0554** (0.0659***) -0.0026 (0.024) 0.0440 (-0.0147) 0.0250 (0.0144)
Small positive NI (SPOS) EQUITY (1) DEBT (2) FINCON-PE (3) REPUT. (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(1) (3)-(4) (4)-(2)
Coefficient -0.0066* -0.0171*** -0.0051 -0.0161*** 0.0084 0.0061 0.0149*** -0.0004
Coefficient - Reverse  Reg. -0.0237* -0.0966*** -0.0397 -0.0611***
N 9,649 9,510 9,460 9,589
N IFRS Observations 295 156 106 235
Large negative NI (LNEG) EQUITY (1) DEBT (2) FINCON-PE (3) REPUT. (4) (1)-(2) (3)-(1) (3)-(4) (4)-(2)
Coefficient 0.2834*** 0.0077 0.0352 0.0004 0.2823*** -0.2547*** 0.0319 -0.0044
Coefficient - Reverse  Reg. 0.0965*** 0.0056** 0.0212 0.0014
N 9,649 9,510 9,460 9,589











Panel B: Change in Earnings Quality around IFRS adoptions by Type of Firms
EQUITY Pre Obs. Post Obs. Pre (1) Post (2) Exp. Sign Diff. (2) - (1)
Variability of ΔNI* 53 51 0.0039 0.0081 + 0.0043***
Variability of ΔNI 53 51 0.0049 0.0075 + 0.0026*
Variability of ΔNI* over  ΔCF* 45 44 0.5963 1.1403 + 0.5440***
Variability of ΔNI over  ΔCF 45 44 0.4717 0.9316 + 0.4599***
Correlation of ACC* and CF* 53 51 -0.7085 -0.5728 + 0.1356
Correlation of ACC and CF 53 48 -0.6630 -0.6232 + 0.0397
Obs. Coefficient Exp. Sign Significance
Small positive NI (SPOS) -0.0243 - No
Large negative NI (LNEG) 0.2425 + No
DEBT Pre Obs. Post Obs. Pre (1) Post (2) Exp. Sign Diff. (2) - (1)
Variability of ΔNI* 83 99 0.0021 0.0016 + -0.0005
Variability of ΔNI 83 99 0.0025 0.0018 + -0.0007
Variability of ΔNI* over  ΔCF* 81 90 0.6092 0.4967 + -0.1126
Variability of ΔNI over  ΔCF 81 90 0.4166 0.3396 + -0.0770
Correlation of ACC* and CF* 82 99 -0.7902 -0.7585 + 0.0317
Correlation of ACC and CF 83 99 -0.7171 -0.7122 + 0.0048
Exp. Sign Significance
Small positive NI (SPOS) -0.0753 - No
Large negative NI (LNEG) - + -
FINCON-PE Pre Obs. Post Obs. Pre (1) Post (2) Exp. Sign Diff. (2) - (1)
Variability of ΔNI* 42 34 0.0041 0.0035 + -0.0006
Variability of ΔNI 44 34 0.0031 0.0037 + 0.0007
Variability of ΔNI* over  ΔCF* 40 17 0.4155 0.2171 + -0.1983***
Variability of ΔNI over  ΔCF 40 17 0.2068 0.2189 + 0.0121
Correlation of ACC* and CF* 41 33 -0.8157 -0.6424 + 0.1732
Correlation of ACC and CF 44 34 -0.8312 -0.6971 + 0.1341
Exp. Sign Significance
Small positive NI (SPOS) 0.1562 - No
Large negative NI (LNEG) - + -
REPUTATION Pre Obs. Post Obs. Pre (1) Post (2) Exp. Sign Diff. (2) - (1)
Variability of ΔNI* 199 143 0.0027 0.0031 + 0.0004
Variability of ΔNI 202 143 0.0030 0.0032 + 0.0003
Variability of ΔNI* over  ΔCF* 178 121 0.4263 0.6880 + 0.2616***
Variability of ΔNI over  ΔCF 181 121 0.3679 0.5352 + 0.1673***
Correlation of ACC* and CF* 195 142 -0.8733 -0.7635 + 0.1098***
Correlation of ACC and CF 202 143 -0.8509 -0.7343 + 0.1166***
Exp. Sign Significance
Small positive NI (SPOS) -0.1788 - **














TABLE 4 (continued) 
Notes: Panel A presents results for several earnings quality measures for different types of IFRS adopting private firms 
in the post-adoption period and for a comprehensive sample of German GAAP firms whose earnings quality is 
measured using all available observations over the sample period. Panel B shows the changes in earnings quality 
measures for the different IFRS adopting firm types from the pre- to post-adoption period. IFRS adopting firm types 
are identified and defined in Table 2. ΔNI*, ΔCF*, CF* and ACC* are defined as the residuals from regressions of 
ΔNI, ΔCF, CF and ACC, respectively, on the incentive and control variables (see Model 1 to Model 4 in the 
Appendix). ΔNI, ΔCF, CF, ACC are defined in Table 3. Pre Obs. (Post Obs.) indicates firm-year observations before 






The Incremental Effect of IFRS on Earnings Quality 
 
 
Panel A: Post-Adoption Analyses
IFRS (a) German GAAP (b) Diff. (a) - (b)
Variability of ΔNI* (ΔNI) 0.0046 (0.0049) 0.0033 (0.0039) 0.0013† (0.0009††)
N 456 (509) 456 (509)
Variability of ΔNI* (ΔNI) over  ΔCF* (ΔCF) 1.0530 (0.3801) 0.7738 (0.4389) 0.2792† (-0.0588)
N 259 (294) 259 (294)
Correlation of ACC* (ACC) and CF* (CF) -0.7359 (-0.7287) -0.7673 (-0.8056) 0.0314 (0.0769†††)
N 441 (507) 441 (507)
Coefficient Significance
Small positive NI (SPOS)
IFRS vs. German GAAP -0.2014 †††
   "Reverse " specification -0.0876 †††
N 1,018
Large negative NI (LNEG)
IFRS vs. German GAAP 0.1130 †
   "Reverse " specification 0.0087 †
N 1,018
Panel B: Change in Earnings Quality around IFRS adoptions for IFRS and matched German GAAP firms
Pre Obs. Post Obs. Pre (1) Post (2) Exp. Sign Diff. (2) - (1)
Variability of ΔNI* IFRS 192 236 0.0021 0.0038 + 0.0016†††
German GAAP 192 236 0.0020 0.0041 ? 0.0020†††
Variability of ΔNI IFRS 194 236 0.0020 0.0039 + 0.0019†††
German GAAP 194 236 0.0027 0.0036 ? 0.0009†
Variability of ΔNI* over  ΔCF* IFRS 139 129 0.4935 0.7668 + 0.2733†††
German GAAP 139 129 0.7777 0.8244 ? 0.0467
Variability of ΔNI over  ΔCF IFRS 139 129 0.3462 0.4378 + 0.0916††
German GAAP 139 129 0.5204 0.4905 ? -0.0299
Correlation of ACC* and CF* IFRS 191 233 -0.8226 -0.7174 + 0.1052†††
German GAAP 191 233 -0.7998 -0.7454 ? 0.0544
Correlation of ACC and CF IFRS 194 234 -0.7841 -0.6911 + 0.0930†††
German GAAP 194 234 -0.7973 -0.7471 ? 0.0502
Exp. Sign Significance
Small positive NI (SPOS) IFRS - No
German GAAP ? No
Large negative NI (LNEG) IFRS + †††
German GAAP + ††
"Reverse " specification
Small positive NI (SPOS) IFRS - No
German GAAP ? No
Large negative NI (LNEG) IFRS + †





















TABLE 5 (continued) 
 
Notes: This table presents the results on differences in several earnings quality measures between propensity score-
matched IFRS and German GAAP firms. ΔNI*, ΔCF*, CF* and ACC* are defined as the residuals from regressions 
of ΔNI, ΔCF, CF and ACC, respectively, on the incentive and control variables from Table 3.  ΔNI, ΔCF, CF, ACC 
are defined in Table 3. Panel A shows the results for the post-adoption period. Panel B shows the changes in earnings 
quality measures for the IFRS and matched German GAAP firms from the pre- to post-adoption period. Panel C 
compares the changes in earnings quality metrics for IFRS and German GAAP firms between the pre- and post-
adoption period (differences-in-differences test). For definition of earnings quality measures, see Table 3. N indicates 
firm-year observations. †, ††, ††† indicates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level (one-sided). 
 
Panel C: Differences-in-Differences in Earnings Quality Around IFRS Adoptions
IAS German GAAP
Prediction Post-Pre Post-Pre Difference
Variability of ΔNI* IFRS > German GAAP 0.0016 0.0020 -0.0004
Variability of ΔNI IFRS > German GAAP 0.0019 0.0009 0.0010
Variability of ΔNI* over  ΔCF* IFRS > German GAAP 0.2733 0.0467 0.2267
Variability of ΔNI over  ΔCF IFRS > German GAAP 0.0916 -0.0299 0.1214†
Correlation of ACC* and CF* IFRS > German GAAP 0.1052 0.0544 0.0508
Correlation of ACC and CF IFRS > German GAAP 0.0930 0.0502 0.0427
Small positive NI (SPOS) - -0.0690 0.0135 -0.0825
    "Reverse" specification - -0.0170 0.0049 -0.0218
Large negative NI (LNEG) + 0.5904 0.1654 0.4250††




Descriptive Statistics of Disclosure Variables 
 
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics on the variables used in the disclosure analyses. Website = dummy variable taking the value one if the annual report of the firm 
was published on its website, and zero otherwise; Bundesanzeiger = dummy variable taking the value one if the annual report of the firm was retrieved through the 
Elektronischer Bundesanzeiger, and zero otherwise; AR Pages = number of pages of the annual report; MD&A Pages = number of pages of the Management Discussion and 
Analysis section of the annual report; Notes Pages = the number of pages of the notes to the financial statement; Disclosure_content1 = deferred_tax_presented +  
abv_deftax_pages (=1 if  deferred_tax_pages > sample median) +  deferred_tax_expl_notes + deferred_tax_breakdown + tax_rate_disclosed + goodwill_presented + 
goodwill_expl_notes + abv_gw_pages (=1 if  goodwill_expl_pages > sample median); Disclosure_content2 =  abv_deftax_pages + deferred_tax_breakdown + 
tax_rate_disclosed + abv_gw_pages, Disclosure content2 is calculated only for firm-observations that include both deferred tax and goodwill information in the notes (i.e., 
deferred_tax_expl_notes = 1 and goodwill_expl_notes == 1); deferred_tax_disc = dummy variable taking the value one if deferred taxes are presented on the balance sheet, 
and zero otherwise. deferred_tax_pages = number of pages related to information on deferred taxes disclosed in the notes; deferred_tax_expl_notes = dummy variable that 
EQUITY DEBT FINCON-PE REPUTATION Total  EQUITY DEBT FINCON-PE REPUTATION Total  
Financial statement source
Website 0.69*** 0.83*** 0.33 0.33*** 0.56*** 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.10 0.23
Bundesanzeiger 0.31*** 0.17*** 0.67 0.67*** 0.44*** 0.72 0.72 0.70 0.90 0.77
Disclosure quantity
AR Pages 77.58*** 112.58*** 54.85** 65.92*** 81.62*** 32.46 36.39 37.98 22.83 31.43
MD&A Pages 17.69*** 25.30*** 10.63* 10.10*** 16.34*** 7.50 8.73 7.43 5.97 7.29
Notes Pages 27.44*** 36.14*** 28.84*** 31.63*** 32.21*** 6.79 8.19 7.88 6.68 7.30
Disclosure_Content1 6.14*** 5.11*** 6.03*** 5.90*** 5.71*** 2.84 3.60 3.41 3.45 3.33
Disclosure_Content2 2.99*** 2.38*** 2.95*** 2.93*** 2.77*** 0.60 0.85 0.67 0.69 0.70
deferred_tax_presented 0.95*** 0.75* 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.86*** 0.38 0.59 0.51 0.43 0.47
deferred_tax_expl_notes 1.42*** 1.28*** 1.29*** 1.22*** 1.28*** 0.17 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21
deferred_tax_pages 0.94*** 0.85 0.93** 0.92** 0.90*** 0.63 0.78 0.72 0.79 0.73
deferred_tax_breakdown 0.77*** 0.64*** 0.82*** 0.76*** 0.73*** 0.22 0.33 0.32 0.30 0.29
tax_rate_disclosed 0.65*** 0.43* 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.57*** 0.17 0.29 0.07 0.20 0.19
goodwill_presented 0.49 0.32*** 0.40 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.55 0.57 0.56 0.64 0.59
goodwill_expl_notes 0.78 0.82 0.87 0.84 0.83 0.69 0.80 0.95 0.90 0.83
goodwill_expl_pages 0.83*** 1.17*** 0.82*** 1.21*** 1.08*** 0.25 0.23 0.27 0.26 0.25




takes the value of one if the notes contain explanatory information on deferred taxes, and zero otherwise; deferred_tax_breakdown = dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the firm shows a breakdown into deferred tax assets and liabilities, and zero otherwise; tax_rate_disclosed = dummy variable that takes the value of one if the tax rate 
applicable to the company is disclosed; goodwill_presented = dummy variable that takes the value of one if goodwill is separately presented on the balance sheet, and zero 
otherwise; goodwill_expl_notes = dummy variable that takes the value of one if the notes contain explanatory information related to goodwill; goodwill_expl_pages = number 











Comparison of Disclosure Practices of Private IFRS and German GAAP Firms in the Post-
adoption Period 
 
Panel A: IFRS versus German GAAP firms in the Post-adoption period
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AR Pages MD&A Pages Notes Pages Disclosure Content1 Disclosure Content2
IFRS 22.5*** 1.59 22.2*** 2.33*** 2.24***
(6.2) (1.2) (10.5) (10.0) (13.6)
Website 62.9*** 12.5*** 9.14*** -1.03*** -0.10
(12.5) (7.7) (4.1) (-4.4) (-0.8)
Size 7.72*** 1.97*** 3.43*** 0.29*** 0.082*
(6.0) (3.8) (5.8) (4.3) (1.8)
Capital intensity -2.34 1.54 -5.47 -1.98*** -0.080
(-0.2) (0.3) (-1.1) (-3.6) (-0.2)
Sales growth -1.83 -0.53 -2.82*** 0.15 0.041
(-1.1) (-0.8) (-2.8) (1.0) (0.4)
Leverage 5.97 -0.61 3.43 -0.30 0.13
(0.8) (-0.2) (0.8) (-0.6) (0.4)
ROA -1.61 3.32 -4.69 -1.09 -1.28
(-0.1) (0.6) (-0.6) (-0.9) (-1.6)
Big5 -1.85 -0.31 0.78 0.070 0.010
(-0.7) (-0.3) (0.5) (0.3) (0.07)
Foreign Sales -0.042 0.0064 -0.061* 0.0044 0.0021
(-0.7) (0.3) (-1.8) (1.3) (1.0)
Stock Corporation 5.81 0.056 3.67* 0.26 0.35**
(1.4) (0.03) (1.9) (1.2) (2.5)
IPO 12.6* 8.55*** 1.77 0.25 -0.17
(1.7) (2.8) (0.5) (0.8) (-1.0)
Rating 9.46 4.90 -2.42 0.21 0.28
(1.6) (1.5) (-0.7) (0.4) (1.2)
Bonds 0.23 -1.99 0.53 -0.57 -0.35
(0.04) (-0.6) (0.2) (-1.4) (-1.5)
Profit Participation Certificates -7.91 -3.67 -2.72 0.38 -0.0055
(-0.8) (-0.8) (-0.8) (0.7) (-0.02)
PE Ownership -4.87 -0.90 0.22 0.22 0.071
(-1.0) (-0.4) (0.1) (0.8) (0.5)
Constant -160.9*** -45.3*** -66.2*** -2.05 -2.61**
(-5.1) (-3.4) (-5.0) (-1.6) (-2.5)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 711 709 711 711 527
IFRS Post-adoption Observations 362 362 362 362 302
R-squared 0.79 0.59 0.61 0.50 0.67
Adjusted R-squared 0.78 0.57 0.59 0.48 0.65
 60 
 
TABLE 7 (continued) 
 
 
Notes: This table presents results of regressions of disclosure variables on a dummy variable, IFRS, capturing the 
difference in disclosure practices of IFRS and German GAAP reporting firms, and control variables in the post-
adoption period (differences-in-differences test). Panel A includes all IFRS firms and matched German GAAP firms 
with available data. Panel B compares IFRS and German GAAP firms by incentive clusters. Website is defined in 
Table 6. Capital intensity = net property plant and equipment divided by total assets; all other variables are defined in 
Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, *** indicates significantly different from zero at the 






Panel B: IFRS versus German GAAP firms in the Post-adoption period by cluster
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AR Pages MD&A Pages Notes Pages Disclosure Content1 Disclosure Content2
EQUITY 22.5** -0.52 22.5*** 4.32*** 3.32***
(2.5) (-0.1) (5.4) (4.5) (6.4)
DEBT 30.1*** 5.39* 24.2*** 1.51** 2.04***
(3.6) (1.8) (5.3) (2.5) (3.3)
FINCON-PE 25.1*** 4.28** 25.7*** 2.74*** 2.28***
(4.4) (2.3) (7.7) (5.5) (6.2)
REPUTATION 21.0*** -0.066 19.5*** 1.84*** 1.86***




Comparison of Disclosure Practices of Private IFRS and German GAAP Firms 
 in the Pre- versus Post-adoption Period (Differences-in-Differences) 
 
Notes: This table compares pre- and post-adoption disclosure practices of IFRS firms, for which we have both pre- 
and post-adoption observations, with that of German GAAP firms (differences-in-differences test). Panel A includes 
all IFRS and German GAAP firms with available data. Website is defined in Table 6. Capital intensity = net property 
plant and equipment divided by total assets; all other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. *, **, *** indicates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level (two-sided). 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
AR Pages MD&A Pages Notes Pages Disclosure Content1 Disclosure Content2
Post 9.19 1.29 -1.75 0.65 0.15
(1.6) (0.8) (-0.7) (1.4) (0.3)
IFRS -3.74 -1.76 -3.59 -0.031 0.11
(-0.4) (-0.5) (-1.2) (-0.05) (0.2)
IFRS*Post 19.2*** 1.87 20.7*** 1.85** 1.80***
(2.9) (0.7) (4.2) (2.5) (3.5)
Website 35.8*** 3.17 1.72 -1.14* -0.13
(2.8) (0.9) (0.4) (-1.8) (-0.5)
Size 9.27** 1.53 2.14 0.42** 0.17
(2.4) (1.1) (1.4) (2.1) (1.4)
Capital intensity 24.0 16.4* -0.51 -0.50 -1.85**
(0.9) (2.0) (-0.07) (-0.4) (-2.1)
Sales growth -7.28 0.34 -8.14** -0.64 -0.082
(-1.0) (0.2) (-2.7) (-1.4) (-0.2)
Leverage 58.1* 12.3 7.56 2.09 -0.75
(1.9) (1.4) (0.9) (1.3) (-0.6)
ROA 8.27 17.5 -8.44 2.71 0.029
(0.2) (1.0) (-0.6) (0.7) (0.008)
Big5 -1.72 1.33 4.57 0.083 -0.21
(-0.3) (0.6) (1.7) (0.2) (-0.6)
Foreign Sales 0.12 0.030 -0.013 -0.0023 -0.0025
(1.0) (0.7) (-0.3) (-0.3) (-0.4)
Stock Corporation 4.28 -2.98 1.50 -0.72* 0.079
(0.6) (-1.1) (0.6) (-2.0) (0.2)
IPO 40.5** 23.4*** 11.0** 0.54 0.48
(2.4) (3.5) (2.2) (0.7) (0.8)
Rating 16.0* 29.3*** 6.71 -0.87 0.80
(1.8) (4.6) (1.3) (-0.9) (1.2)
Bonds 5.29 -20.5** -0.86 0.96 -0.59
(0.3) (-2.4) (-0.1) (0.8) (-0.9)
Profit Participation Certificates -0.56 28.8** 3.64 -0.056 0.80
(-0.03) (2.6) (0.5) (-0.04) (0.9)
PE Ownership -8.58 -2.89 6.67** 0.084 -0.34
(-0.7) (-0.7) (2.4) (0.2) (-1.0)
Constant -242.8** -41.3 -45.9 -7.49** -6.73***
(-2.7) (-1.3) (-1.6) (-2.0) (-2.7)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 178 178 178 178 122
IFRS Pre-/Post-adoption Observations 54/54 54/54 54/54 54/54 32/47
R-squared 0.83 0.79 0.73 0.49 0.74




Disclosure Channel of Private Firms’ Financial Statements in the Post-adoption Period 
 
Notes: This table presents results of probit regressions of private firms’ choice of disclosure channel for their financial 
reports. The dependent variable is Website and defined in Table 6. Capital intensity = net property plant and equipment 
divided by total assets; all other variables are defined in Table 2. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. *, **, 
*** indicates significantly different from zero at the 10%, 5%, or 1% level (two-sided).  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable : Website All IFRS EQUITY DEBT FINCON-PE REPUTATION
IFRS 0.47* 6.71*** 1.24*** 1.42** 1.33***
(1.8) (6.0) (2.8) (2.5) (2.9)
Size 0.40*** 0.54*** 1.01*** 0.90*** 0.45***
(5.6) (2.7) (5.5) (3.4) (2.7)
Capital intensity -0.20 -0.92 -1.30 0.75 1.75
(-0.4) (-0.7) (-0.8) (0.6) (1.6)
Sales growth -0.39** -1.61*** -0.92 -0.29* 0.84
(-2.0) (-3.8) (-1.6) (-1.8) (0.7)
Leverage -0.64 -1.50 -1.96 -1.13 0.44
(-1.3) (-1.3) (-1.4) (-0.9) (0.3)
ROA 1.99* 5.13** 2.27 7.14** 1.63
(1.7) (2.5) (0.7) (2.1) (0.4)
Big5 -0.21 -0.41 -0.25 -0.47 0.41
(-1.0) (-0.9) (-0.4) (-0.7) (0.9)
Foreign Sales -0.0017 -0.029*** 0.0016 -0.0066 0.0038
(-0.5) (-2.9) (0.2) (-0.8) (0.5)
Stock Corporation 0.57** 0.56 0.079 0.48 1.64***
(2.6) (0.9) (0.2) (0.8) (4.0)
IPO 1.30*** 3.48** -1.95** -0.46





Profit Participation Certificates -1.04 2.44*
(-1.3) (1.8)
PE Ownership -0.59* -3.30*** -1.84
(-1.8) (-4.8) (-1.6)
Constant -7.63*** -7.79** -19.5*** -18.6*** -13.0***
(-4.4) (-2.1) (-5.0) (-3.6) (-3.6)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included
Observations 664 148 161 102 201
IFRS Observations 328 60 84 46 108
Pseudo R-squared 0.39 0.56 0.79 0.43 0.53
